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Klein: Due Process Denied: Judicial Coercion in the Plea Bargaining Proc

DUE PROCESS DENIED: JUDICIAL COERCION IN
THE PLEA BARGAINING PROCESS
RichardKlein *
Our legal system is based on the principle that an independent, fair and
competent judiciary will interpret and apply the laws that govern us.
The role of the Ijudiciary is central to American concepts of justice and
the rule of law.
Felony Trial Court Judge in Detroit: "All this stuff about jury trials and
due process,
what it really amounts to is crooks getting not-guilty
2
verdicts."

Professor of Law, Touro Law School; J.D. Harvard Law School, 1972.
1. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT pmbl. (5th ed. 2000). The initial set of ethical
standards governing judges were the Canons of Judicial Ethics, but almost fifty years after the
Canons were first adopted, the House of Delegates of the ABA enacted the Code of Judicial
Conduct in 1972. The ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility
determined in 1986 that a comprehensive review of the Code was appropriate. Four years later, the
Model Code of Judicial Conduct was adopted; it was amended in 1997, 1999, and 2003. See id. At
the August 2003 meeting of the ABA House of Delegates, amendments were adopted to the Model
Code of Judicial Conduct designed to address First Amendment challenges to restrictions on speech
during judicial campaigns. See American Judicature Society, Amendments to ABA Model Code
Adopted, WKLY. JUDICIAL ETHICs NEws, Aug. 20, 2003. As of 2004, there is an ABA Joint
Commission on Evaluation of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct examining possible
improvements in the Code. See Patricia Manson, ABA Contemplates Reworking Rules of
ProfessionalConductfor Judges, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Sept. 26, 2003, at 3. The ABA President,
Dennis Archer, explained the need for such a commission: "It has been 12 years since the ABA took
a good, hard look at the Code to see if it provides adequate guidance to judges about their conduct,
and to the public about what to expect from judges." Id. The Joint Commission held its first hearing
in December of 2003, and has scheduled hearings for 2004 at various locations throughout the
country.
2. Comments of Detroit, Michigan Recorder Court Judge Leonard Townsend as reported in
Andy Court, Special Report: Poorman's Justice, AM. LAW., Jan./Feb. 1993, at 56. The Recorder's
Court is the trial court for all felony offenses in Detroit and other parts of Wayne County, Michigan.
The judge added: "I'm not talking about cases where it's arguable. I'm talking about cases where
you have a guilty person walking out the door [because of a misguided jury verdict]. It happens
quite a lot." Id.
*
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The Court [a Justice of the New York State Supreme Court]: "Now the
offer in this case, Mr. Barry,for today3 only is three to six which he [the
defendant] is not obligated to accept."
A Juvenile Court judge in Georgia: "I tell the minor, I will up the
sentence if you take it 'to trial, because you could have pleaded and
saved us all this trouble. A
Report of the New York State Special Commission on Attica: "What
makes inmates most cynical about their pre-prison experience is the
plea bargaining system.... [A]lmost 90% of the inmates surveyed had
been solicited to enter a plea bargain. Most were bitter.. .. "5

It is, perhaps, in the criminal courts of our largest cities where
judges most commonly fail to comply with the professional and ethical
mandates that they are required to uphold. In the New York State
Supreme Court case cited above,6 the judge made it clear that if the
defendant were to refuse the "for today only" plea offer and choose
instead to go to trial, he would, if convicted, be sentenced to the
maximum prison time the law permitted. 7 The defendant responded to

3. Official Court Transcript at 4, People v. Derrick Smith (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998) (Indictment
No. 7996-98) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Official Court Transcript].
4.

ABA JUVENILE JUSTICE CENTER & THE SOUTHERN CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ET AL.,

GEORGIA: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN
DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 31 (Patricia Puritz & Tammy Sun eds., 2001) (emphasis added)
[hereinafter GEORGIA: AN ASSESSMENT]. This 2001 examination of the juvenile justice system in
Georgia found that pleas are frequently taken by the Court without any input or even presence of
counsel and without any colloquy to determine if the child even understood his rights.
5.

REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE SPECIAL COMMISSION ON ATTICA 30-31 (1972)

(emphasis added). The Commission was empanelled to examine the causes of the inmate rioting at
Attica State Prison in 1971. See id. at xxiii.
6. See Official Court Transcript, supra note 3, at 4.
7. Telephone Interview with Frank Bari, defendant's attorney (Sept. 10, 2003). As is true
with much of the plea bargaining that occurs in our criminal courts, the transcript itself does not
reflect the entire proceeding because the plea "discussion" and details are, as here, "off the record".
See Official Court Transcript, supra note 3, at 3 (indicating that a "[d]iscussion off the record"
occurred as evidenced by the statement "The Court: On the record, Joyce," which followed. Joyce
was the first name of the Court Reporter.). Most plea discussions where the judge is involved occur
at the judge's bench and are rarely transcribed by a court reporter. For example, an analysis of plea
bargaining in the criminal courts of North Carolina revealed that in almost 85% of the cases, the
reporter rarely or never records what is discussed when the judge had initiated or even participated
in plea discussions. Norman Lefstein, Plea Bargaining and the Trial Judge, the New ABA
Standards, and the Need to Control Judicial Discretion, 59 N.C. L. REv. 477, 504 tbl.IV (1981).
The 1986 second edition of the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice had required all plea bargain
discussions that involved the judge to be transcribed verbatim in order to avoid the possibility of
judicial coercion of the defendant. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PLEAS OF GUILTY,
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the judge: "I'm 19 years old, your Honor ....

That is terrible. ... That's

terrible." 8 The defendant turned and told his mother, who was weeping
as she sat in the courtroom, 9 "Mom, I can't do it" and 0jumped to his
death out of the window of the sixteenth floor courtroom.'
The Smith case stands out, and was the object of press coverage, not
because of the coercive tactics of the judge that were designed to achieve
a plea," but because of the defendant's subsequent suicide. The "for
today only," "this is a one-time-offer," "if you don't plead guilty you'll
get the max if convicted at trial" style-of-judging is all too common to
warrant tabloid headlines. 12 There was no media coverage at all when
another New York State Supreme Court judge allegedly told the
defendant's counsel: "Tell the defendant that if he doesn't take the 15
years to Life, I promise if he is found guilty after trial, I will give him 25
to Life for the murder and 12-V2 to 25 for the attempted murder, running
consecutive."' 3 Over the years, a pattern has emerged where judges
Standard 14-3.3 (2d ed. 1986). The current edition of the ABA Standards For Criminal Justice,
Pleas of Guilty severely limits judicial participation in the plea bargaining process. See ABA
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PLEAS OF GUILTY, Standard 14-3.3(c) (3d ed. 1999)
[hereinafter PLEAS OF GUILTY]; see also State v. Faulk, 840 So. 2d 319, 320 (Fla. 2003) (trial court
conducted unauthorized plea discussions off the record); State v. Williams, 666 N.W.2d 58, 60, 65
(Wis. 2003) (prohibiting the judge from playing any role in the plea bargaining process and
allowing the defendant to withdraw a plea resulting from the trial judge's invitation to the
defendant, his counsel, and the prosecutor to "have a little chat in chambers"). The off-the-record,
secretive plea negotiating in many instances violates the requirement set out by the Supreme Court
that if the plea "was induced by promises, the essence of those promises must in some way be
known." Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261-62 (1971). The threats that are used to
"persuade" the defendant to enter the plea should be part of the record as well.
8. Official Court Transcript, supra note 3, at 4; see also Laura Italiano & Larry Celona,
Horror Suicide at Courthouse; Mom Sees Suspect's 16-Story Death Leap, N.Y. POST, Oct. 30,
1998, at 5.
9. See Italiano & Celona, supra note 8.
10. David Rohde, Prisoner Leapt to Death Despite Pleafor Suicide Watch, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
31, 1998, at B2.
1I. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals has explained what is meant by "coercive" in this
context: "To say that a practice is 'coercive' or renders a plea 'involuntary' means only that it
creates improper pressure that would be likely to overbear the will of some innocent persons and
cause them to plead guilty." United States v. Pollard, 959 F.2d 1011, 1021 (D.C. Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 506 U.S. 915 (1992).
12. For example, in a 2003 Florida case, the judge told the defendant that "the court made an
offer to your attorney to resolve this case ....
You reject the offer it's not going to be made again.
I'm not going to make the offer again." Faulk, 240 So. 2d at 320 (emphasis added).
13. People v. Lewis, 630 N.Y.S.2d 605, 607 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995) (emphasis added). The
defendant alleged in a series of motions that the judge had made the quoted comment. See id Even
though there apparently is no transcript of the judge's promise (the promise was allegedly made
while counsel was at the judge's bench and therefore off the record), the defendant's allegation, as
discussed by the appellate court reviewing the matter, does not appear to have been challenged
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routinely engage in practices that violate the constitutional rights of the
defendants who come before them, and which run counter to the ethical
conduct that we have a right to expect and demand from those
empowered to engage in critical decisions concerning the liberty of our
citizens. 14
Consider for example the actions of the judge in the case of People
v. Jorge Delgado.15 The attorney, employed by the Legal Aid Society of
the City of New York, was outside of the courtroom discussing a matter
with a client, when the Delgado case, which was also assigned to her,
was called and ready to be heard in the courtroom. 16 Upon her return to
the court, counsel and defendant were informed of a plea offer, and the
judge told the attorney and her client: "Come on. Let's go. ''17 Counsel
responded that she was speaking with her client about the plea offer and
when the judge told her "Time up. Does he want the offer or not?" 18 the
attorney responded: "No, Your Honor. Since I don't have the time to
finish completing my discussion with my client, he doesn't want to take
the offer today." 19 The judge then proceeded to tell the attorney to "leave
either by the judge, the defense counsel or the prosecution. See id.See also United States v.
Coronado, 554 F.2d 166, 172 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied 434 U.S. 870 (1977) ("Even a plea taking
session should have more dignity than a bargain basement sale at a department store.").
14. See, e.g., PLEAS OF GUILTY, supra note 7, Standard 14-1.8.
The court [shall] not impose upon a defendant any sentence in excess of that which
would be justified by any of the protective, deterrent, or other purposes of the criminal
law because the defendant has chosen to require the prosecution to prove guilt at trial
ratherthan to enter a plea of guilty or nolo contendere."
Id. (emphasis added). Imposing a prison sentence, which is longer than justified by the
circumstances simply because the defendant chose not to plead guilty, "is forbidden by Standard 141.8(b)" because it would create the perception that courts penalize defendants for exercising their
constitutional right to a jury trial. Id. at Standard 14-1.8 cmt.; see also NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N
ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS & GOALS, COURTS, Standard 3.1 (1973) (instructing courts,
when determining the sentence to be imposed, not to consider whether the defendant pled guilty).
15. There is no reported decision in this case which was prosecuted in the Criminal Court of
the City of New York, New York County in September, 1999. See Recant (N.Y. Comm'n on
Judicial Conduct, Nov. 19, 2001), available at http://www.scjc.state.ny.us/Determinations/
R/Recant.htm.
16. See id.
17. Id.
18. Id. (emphasis added). See United States v. Coronado, 554 F.2d 166, 172 (5th Cir. 1977)
(plea bargaining should be "unhurried and patient"), cert. denied,434 U.S. 870 (1977).
19. Recant. An empirical study of 250 inmates in Alaska focused on the inmates' reactions to
their most recent defense attorneys. A common inmate complaint was that their counsel had not
stood up for them to enforce their rights, was too anxious to make a deal, and that the attorney,
rather than working for them, worked for the state. Marcus T. Boccaccini & Stanley L. Brodsky,
Characteristicsof the Ideal Criminal Defense Attorney from the Client's Perspective. Empirical
Findings and Implications for Legal Practice,25 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 81, 98 (2001). In other
words, exactly what Judge Recant attempted to get this counsel to do in Delgado.
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the courtroom as soon as we are done with this. Don't come back., 20 The
judge then vacated the attorney's assignment to the case and assigned a
court-appointed counsel in her place. 2' Apparently, the judge only
wished to have appearing before her "cooperative lawyers, 22 who
understood that the business taking place in the courtroom was to
dispose of cases.2 3 Any concern for the rights of defendants would
unnecessarily waste the court's time.24 It was clearly of no import to the
judge that counsel comply with her obligation as "an officer of the
court" to "render effective, quality representation., 25 There was no
20. Recant A judge's anger at counsel can sometimes lead the judge to strike at the easier
target-the lawyer's client. For example, a California judge told the Deputy District Attorney that
he was going to teach counsel a lesson for seeking a jury trial; to wit, that counsel's client, who had
been offered no jail time if he were to have plead guilty, would be sentenced to jail. Richard Ryan v.
Commission on Judicial Performance, 754 P.2d 724, 732 (1988). The defendant was convicted, and
imprisoned. See id
21. See Recant. In New York City, the general policy is to have the Legal Aid Society
assigned to represent indigents accused of crime and to use appointed private counsel to appear
when there are co-defendants and a risk of a conflict of interest among the defendants.
22. Justice Brennan commented that "[t]o satisfy the Constitution, counsel must function as
an advocate for the defendant, as opposed to afriend of the court." Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745,
758 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967))
(emphasis added).
23. Cf Recant (finding that the judge "mistreated both defendants and attorneys, abused her
judicial powers, and ignored proper legal procedure"). The situation that exists in American courts
is disturbingly similar to that which occurs in courts in Toronto, Canada except that the plea deal in
Toronto is always worked out between the defendant and the prosecutor, not the judge. The
following is a description of the Toronto criminal court scene:
[T]he daily justice bazaar is in full swing .... Behind closed doors, lawyers haggle over
where in the punishment range the sentence will fall. . .. It's usually over in a flash....
Plea bargaining is the key tool to deal with the more than 100,000 charges that move
through Toronto's provincial courts each year.
Donovan Vincent & Nick Pron, Closed Doors: Justice by Plea Bargain, TORONTO STAR, Mar. 10,
2001.
24. See, e.g., GEORGIA: AN ASSESSMENT, supra note 4, at 2 (indicating that judges viewed
counsel as standing in the way of the courts accomplishing their goals, resulting in counsel's having
a severely diminished role).
25. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE
FUNCTION Standard 4-1.2(b) (3d ed. 1993) [hereinafter PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE
FUNCTION] (stating that the "basic duty defense counsel owes to the administration of justice and as
an officer of the court is to serve as the accused's counselor and advocate with courage and devotion
and the render effective, quality representation"). In 1967, the ABA was the first organization to
enact standards relating to criminal defense services by adopting the ABA Standards for Criminal
Justice, Providing Defense Services, and then followed by adopting the Defense Function in 1971,
and the ABA Guidelines For Appointment and Performance of Counsel In Criminal Cases in 1989.
Other institutions have enacted standards relating to criminal justice issues as well: The National
Legal Aid and Defender Association adopted Performance Guidelines For Criminal Defense
Representation in 1994; the National Study Commission on Defense Services presented the
Guidelines for Legal Defense Systems in the United States in 1976, and the President's National
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indication that the judge felt any need to comply with the holding of the
court in United States ex rel. Elksnis v. Gilligan26 that due process is
violated if the plea does not represent "the considered choice of the
accused., 27 There was no adherence to the all-too-clear statement of one
state's supreme court when considering disciplinary action against a
judge: "'Common courtesy and considerate treatment of [others] are
traits properly expected of judges. Court proceedings and all other
' 28
judicial acts must be conducted with fitting dignity and decorum.'
There was absolutely no attention given to the instruction in the ABA
Criminal Justice Standards on Discovery 29 that there should exist
discovery procedures that provide a defendant with "sufficient
information to make an informed plea" 30 because the "informed plea is
crucial to the integrity of the criminal justice system.",31 The Supreme
Court explained the requirement:
[T]he defendant and his counsel must make their best judgment as to
the weight of the State's case. Counsel must predict how the facts, as
he understands them, would be viewed by a court. If proved, would
those facts convince a judge or jury of the defendant's guilt? On those
facts would evidence seized without a warrant be admissible? Would
the trier of fact on those facts find a confession voluntary and
admissible? Questions like these cannot be answered with certitude;
yet a decision
to plead guilty must necessarily rest upon counsel's
32
answers.

Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals adopted Chapter 13, The Defense,
in 1973. See ABA, THE TEN PRINCIPLES OF A PUBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY SYSTEM 4 n.2 (2002).

26. United States ex rel. Elksnis v. Gilligan, 256 F. Supp. 244 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
27. Id. at 253 (emphasis added).
28. In re Perry, 641 So. 2d 366, 369 (Fla. 1994) (quoting In re Turner, 421 So. 2d 1077, 1081
(Fla. 1982)).
29. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE DISCOVERY AND TRIAL BY JURY (3d ed. 1996)
[hereinafter DISCOVERY].

30. Id. at Standard 1l-l.l(a)(ii). There is considerably less information provided to one's
adversary as a matter of course in criminal proceedings than in civil. If the defense counsel does not
subpoena or file motions seeking discoverable material he will not obtain information which might
prove to be vital for the defense of his client. Even when the defense is self-defense, the prosecution
is not obligated to provide the defendant with the arrest record of the victim unless specifically
requested by defense counsel to do so. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110 n.17 (1976),
modified by United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 681 (1985) (finding that the Court's prior
formulation of Agurs, as applied in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), covers situations
where the defendant's attorney either specifically requested, or failed to specifically request, certain
information from the prosecution).
31. DISCOVERY, supranote 29, at Standard 11-1.1 (a)(ii) cmt.
32. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 769-70 (1970).
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And judges may well believe that in order for defendants in future
cases to know that the judge indeed means business when he or she
threatens "the max, 33 the judge must make it crystal clear at sentencing
time:
If you'd have come in here, as you should have done in the first
instance, to save the State the trouble of calling a jury, I would
probably have sentenced you, as I indicated to you I would have
sentenced you, to one to life in the penitentiary. It will cost you nine
years additional,
because the sentence now is ten to life in the
34
penitentiary.
One might well expect that there would be a successful appeal of a
sentence such as this, based on the claim that the sentence was excessive
in that the judge's initial assessment of the appropriate punishment was
one-tenth of the sentence imposed, but appeals courts know how the
game has to be played to get the desired result of the pre-trial plea of
guilty. In State v. Pennington,35 the New Jersey Supreme Court
established an absolute rule that "public policy.., prohibits [the] use of
rejected plea offers" in determining whether the ultimate sentence of the
trial judge was excessive in relation to the offense committed.3 6 Exactly
what is the "public policy"? That a defendant must know that the trial
judge will indeed punish the defendant for the exercise of his
constitutional right to trial? The court stated pretty much exactly that.
The court explained that to permit the defendant to compare the judge's
pre-trial plea offer with the post-trial sentence "would unfairly
undermine plea negotiations, an essential tool in the administration of
criminal justice. '37 Certainly a decision such as this from the state's
highest court can function to encourage judges not only to engage in the

33. If the judge's reputation for sentencing a convicted defendant to the maximum amount
permissible becomes well enough known, the judge might not in every case need to articulate the
threat. A defendant told by the judge what the sentence would be were he to plead guilty, would
know what would await him were he to choose instead to go to trial.
34. People v. Moriarty, 185 N.E.2d 688, 689 (II1. 1962) (emphasis added); see also People v.
Young, 314 N.E. 2d 280, 281 (111.
App. Ct. 1974) ("I have no inclination to give you the same thing
had you chose to throw yourself on the mercy of the Court. I will add one year." (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
35. 712A.2d 1133(N.J. 1998).
36. Id.at 1142.
37. Id. The sole dissenter wrote that the court had "unnecessarily and improperly imposed a
blanket restriction against any consideration of plea offers by appellate courts in reviewing
excessive-sentence challenges. Id. at 1144 (Stein, J., dissenting).
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threat of a maximum sentence if the defendant38does not plead guilty, but
also to feel free to actually carry out the threat.
Further support for the principle that however disparate the posttrial sentence is from that which was offered pre-trial, the excessiveness
of the sentence imposed after the trial should not be measured by that
which was offered pre-trial, comes from those courts applying contract
theory to the plea bargaining context. 39 The New Jersey Supreme Court
determined that "consistent with contract principles.., a rejected plea
should have no impact on sentencing following a trial., 40 In ruling that
the rejection by the defendant of the sentence-deemed-appropriate
during plea negotiations voids that offer "for all purposes," the court
made it clear that the sentence imposed after trial can be many times
greater than that offered earlier.4 1
To apply contract theory to a situation where an all-powerful judge
is negotiating with a powerless defendant about how long the judge will
send the defendant to prison for is inappropriate.42 The process of
negotiation generally implies and assumes relatively comparable
positions of power on each side. The Commentary to the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts43 defines "undue influence" in a way that is
certainly applicable to judicially-initiated plea bargaining: "Undue
influence is unfair persuasion of a party who is under the domination of
the person exercising the persuasion or who by virtue of the relation

38. Just days before the trial began, the offer to the defendant was a prison term of fifteen
years with no parole possible until seven and a half years were served. State v. Pennington, 693
A.2d 1222, 1225 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 1997), rev'd, State v. Pennington, 712 A.2d 1133 (N.J.
1998). After trial, the sentence was life plus twenty years with no parole possible until the defendant
was incarcerated for at least thirty-five years. See id.The Appellate Division of the Superior Court
of New Jersey had determined that the "extreme disparity" between the pre-trial offer and the
sentence actually imposed was a factor to be considered when evaluating the ultimate
reasonableness of the post-trial sentence. See id.
39. See, e.g., Petition of Geisser, 554 F.2d 698, 704 (5th Cir. 1977) ("a plea bargain is
contractual in nature"). See generally Peter Westen & David Westin, A Constitutional Law of
Remedies or Broken Plea Bargains, 66 CAL. L. REV. 471 (1978) (suggesting that the contract law
provides the most appropriate remedies for breached plea agreements).
40. Pennington, 712 A.2d at 1142.
41. Id.at 1147.
42. See People v. Selikoff, 318 N.E.2d 784, 791-92 (N.Y.1974) (Itis incongruous to apply
contract law to plea negotiations; public policies favoring rehabilitation, protection of society, and

might derive from permitting defendants to enter into
deterrence are "paramount to benefits" that
plea contracts.).
43. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (1981).
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between them is justified in assuming' 4 that that person
manner inconsistent with his welfare.
Perhaps the defendant in State v. Williams,4 5 who
plea with the judge in the judge's chambers, best
regarding undue influence as he was later attempting
plea:

will not act in a
"negotiated" his
made the point
to withdraw his

I had no intentions of pleading guilty, but ... you invited me into

[your] chambers, you influenced me and pressured me into giving a
guilty plea....
Your Honor, since I originally turned down a plea bargain in the
hallway, I can honestly say if you wouldn't have taken me in your
chambers, I wouldn't have never pled guilty. Myself being in a
powerful judge's
chambers, you eroded my ability to make a decision
46
of my own.

The bringing of a defendant into the judge's chambers is truly
bringing the "full force and majesty of [the] office ' 4 7 of the judge home
to the defendant. Most defendants, however, don't need to be taken into
chambers to be aware of the "awesome power ' 48 of the judge. The judge
sitting on high in his robes is symbolism enough.49
44. Id. at § 177(1); N. Am. Rayon Corp. v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 12 F.3d 583, 589
(6th Cir. 1993) (applying New York law, which defines undue influence as "exist[ing] where a
relationship of control exists between the contracting parties, and the stronger party influences the
weaker party in a way that destroys the weaker party's free will and substitutes for it the will of the
stronger party"); see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 43, at § 175 cmt., quoted in United States v.
Speed Joyeros, S.A., 204 F. Supp. 2d 412, 425 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (explaining that the implict threat
contained in the offer made by the prosecutor could "arouse such fear as precludes a party from
exercising free will and judgment or that it [is] such as would induce assent on the part of a brave
man or a man of ordinary firmness").
45. 666 N.W.2d 58 (Wis. 2003).
46. Id. at 62 (alteration in original). The "susceptibility of the person persuaded" is to be taken
into account when assessing whether of not there has been "undue influence." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 177 cmt. b (1981).
47. United States ex rel. Elksnis v. Gilligan, 256 F. Supp. 244, 254 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
48. Id.
49. See id. Not all defendants (or counsel for that matter) would have the same view of the
robes that former Supreme Court Chief Justice Arthur Vanderbilt had: "The wearing of a judicial
robe by a judge is important in part because it reminds all concerned of the fact that the judge
represents the law on which liberty depends...." Hon. Arthur T. Vanderbilt, The Municipal
Court-The Most Important Court in New Jersey: Its Remarkable Progress and Its Unsolved
Problems, 10 RUTGERS L. REv. 647, 653 (1956) (emphasis added). And some may feel the
following description by a former law professor to be somewhat extreme:
Glaring down from their elevated perches, insulting, abrupt, rude, sarcastic, patronizing,
intimidating, vindictive, insisting on not merely respect but almost abject servility-such
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To be sure, there is the appearance of arbitrariness when a judge
just throws a certain number of extra years at a defendant who chose to
go to trial rather than plead guilty. And it is this abuse of judicial
50
discretion that the Supreme Court warned of in Duncan v. Louisiana:
Providing an accused with the right to be tried by a jury of his peers
gave him an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous
prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge....
[T]he jury trial provisions in the Federal and State Constitutions reflect
a fundamental decision about the exercise of official power-a
reluctance to entrust plenary powers over the life and liberty of the
51
citizen to one judge ....
As to those judges who do act arbitrarily, the criminal justice
system would be far better off if they were not quite so crude about it all.
For example, the judge in People v. Young 52 explained to the defendant
why he was getting sentenced to a longer prison term after the trial:
"You shot the dice and they just came up craps. 53 In State v. Peterson,54
there was only a slight deviation from that language as the trial judge
explained to the defendant that he had "rolled the dice in a high stakes
game with the jury, and it's very apparent that [you] lost that gamble. 55
Somehow, exercising one's constitutional right to trial ought not be
analogized to a roll of the dice-the imposition of extra years of
incarceration is not quite comparable a penalty as is the dice "coming up
craps."
But for an extreme example of a judge acting arbitrarily, consider
the action of a veteran Long Island judge who had to determine the
appropriate sentence for the defendant who had pled guilty to driving
while impaired.56 The judge increased the sentence because the
defendant was wearing jeans, explaining that the fine "would be

judges are frequently encountered in American trial courts, particularly in the lowest
criminal and juvenile courts which account for most of our criminal business. Indeed, the
lower the court, the worse the behavior.
Herman Schwartz, Judges as Tyrants, 7 CRIM. L. BULL. 129, 129-30 (1971) (footnote omitted).
50. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).

51.

Id.at 156.

52.
53.
54.

314 N.E.2d 280 (Ill. 1974).
Id. at 281.
571 S.E.2d 883 (N.C. 2002).

55. Id. at 884. The Court of Appeals in North Carolina did find that a new sentencing hearing
was required because it was clear that the sentence after trial was, in part, punishment for the
defendant's choice to go to trial. See id. at 885.
56. See Chau Lam, Crime (and Denim) Doesn't Pay, NEWSDAY, Dec. 6, 2003, at A03.
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normally 300 [dollars], but it will be 350 [dollars] because he's got a
pair of jeans on.",57 But lest anyone think that the defendant was being
punished for wearing jeans, the judge clarified that the extra fine wasn't
punishment, the defendant just would have gotten a break if he hadn't
been wearing the jeans.5 8 The judge didn't elaborate on what other forms
of appearance-overweight,
dreadlocked, tatooed-might
also
disqualify a defendant from lenient treatment, but did add that "[i]f you
show the law respect, the law will show respect back to you. ' 59
In People v. Dennis, 60 the pretrial offer was two-to-six years
imprisonment, while the sentence after trial was forty-to-eighty,61 even
though the judge clearly did know at the time of the plea offer the
strength of the prosecutor's case and the defendant's prior criminal
history. 62 Whereas the forty-to-eighty term was certainly arbitrary, so
was the sentence of the Illinois appellate court, which determined that
punishing the defendant for exercising his right to trial by increasing the
amount of incarceration twenty-fold was unconstitutional, but three-fold
was not. The sentence was reduced "in the interests of justice" to six-toeighteen years.63
The standard of what an acceptable punishment for choosing to go
to trial in Illinois was to be was measured after the Dennis case by
comparing post-conviction sentence increases to the twenty-timesgreater sentence imposed by the Dennis trial court. So, appellate review
in People v. Carroll64 did not find the sentence by the trial court in that
matter to be inappropriate because "the sentence imposed was only twoand-a-halftimes that which was offered to [the defendant] at the pre-trial
conference; clearly, this does not approach the excessive nature of the
sentence deemed an improper punishment in Dennis."65 If the
punishment is not twenty times greater for choosing to go to trial rather
than pleading guilty, then is it to be found acceptable? Is a sentence
which is only two-and-one-half times greater than that which was
offered pre-trial really appropriate? What about a sentence of eight years
imprisonment imposed after trial when the pre-trial offer in exchange for
57. Id.
58. See id
59.
60.
61.

Ed Lowe, Judge Gets a DressingDown, NEWSDAY, Dec. 12, 2003, at A8.
328 N.E.2d 135 (Il1. 1975).
Seeid. at138.

62. See id.
63. Id.
64.
65.

631 N.E.2d 1155 (Il. 1992).
Id. at 1175 (emphasis added).
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a guilty plea was two years probation?66 Or, when the defendant was
given a sentence of
thirty years post-trial compared to the plea offer of
67
forty-two months?

As is true for all judges, whether assigned to criminal or civil court,
the American Bar Association Model Code of Judicial Conduct 68 is
69
"intended to govern conduct of judges and to be binding upon them.,
A pervasive theme of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct is the import
of the judiciary acting honorably and with integrity 7 so that the public
will have confidence in its judges. 71 The very first paragraph of the
72
Preamble, for example, describes judicial office as a "public trust
where the judge is a "highly visible symbol of government., 73 The
Commentary to the very first Canon of the Code warns that "violation of
this Code diminishes public confidence in the judiciary and thereby does
66. See People v. Peddicord, 407 N.E.2d 89, 93 (II1. 1980). The appeals court upheld the
sentence, rejecting the defendant's claim that the post-trial sentence constituted punishment for
choosing to go to trial. The court used Dennis once again as the standard, concluding that "[i]n the
present case the 8-year sentence imposed is not as grossly disparate as that found in Dennis." Id. at
94.
67. See McDonald v. State, 751 So. 2d 56, 58 (Fla. 1999). The Court of Appeals of Florida
did conclude that the sentence was vindictive and remanded the case with directions to resentence
the defendant to a term of forty-eight months. See id. at 59-60.
68. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 1. The Model Code forms the basis for
the state-adopted codes of judicial conduct in every state but Montana whose rules of conduct for
the judiciary are not based on the Model Code. See Cynthia Gray, The Line Between Legal Error
and Judicial Misconduct: Balancing Judicial Independence and Accountability, 32 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 1245 (2004). The current Code, designed to replace the 1972 Code, was adopted by the ABA
House of Delegates in August of 1990.

69. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 1, pmbl. The Commentary to Canon I
informs that judges "must comply with the law, including the provisions of this Code." Id. at Canon
I cmt. (emphasis added).
70. In 2003, the Model Code of Judicial Conduct's Canon 1 Commentary was amended to
explain what was meant by "integrity": "A judiciary of integrity is one in which judges are known
for their probity, fairness, honesty, uprightness, and soundness of character." Id. (Any resemblance
to the Boy Scout Pledge, is, I'm sure, completely unintended.)
71. See id. It would be difficult to imagine the public being confident in the judiciary that
presides over prosecutions of juveniles in Virginia. An ABA Juvenile Justice Center investigative
analysis of the courts concluded:
Nothing appeared more "second rate" than watching the countless families endure the
humiliating process of going through juvenile court.... Families sat on benches and the
clerk called them into court over a loudspeaker system. Several investigators repeatedly
noted the rude and often cutting manner in which juvenile court personnel, including
judges, spoke to children and their families.
ABA JUVENILE JUSTICE CENTER & THE MID-ATLANTIC JUVENILE DEFENDER CENTER ET AL.,
VIRGINIA: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN

DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 31-32 (Patricia Puritz et al. eds., 2002) (emphasis added).
72.

MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 1, pmnbl.

73. Id.
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injury to the system of government under law."74 The first sentence of
Canon 2 reiterates that judges '.'shall act at all times in a manner that
promotes public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary. '75 The
Commentary to that Canon warns judges
that they "must expect to be the
76
subject of constantpublic scrutiny.,
There is, perhaps, no part of our justice system that is as visible to
the public as are the criminal courts. It is, therefore, of paramount
importance that the judges, who sit in criminal cases, comply with the
mandate to act honorably, fairly77 and with integrity.78 And since the
vast majority of the criminal prosecutions that occur throughout the
country result in pleas of guilty, 79 the conduct of the judiciary in
relationship to plea bargaining is of crucial import.8 °
Recognizing the need to identify ethical standards relating to plea
bargaining for defense counsel, prosecutors, and judges, the ABA
adopted Standards for Criminal Justice,81 Chapter 14-Pleas of Guilty.8 2
The most recent edition deleted previous provisions, which had
established procedures for judicial participation in plea bargaining,8 3 and

74. Id. Canon I cmt. (emphasis added). The Canon itself describes an "honorablejudiciary"
as "indispensable to justice in our society." Id. Canon I (emphasis added).
75. Id. Canon 2 (emphasis added).
76. Id. Canon 2 cmt. (emphasis added).
77. See, e.g., id. Canon 3(B)(8): "A judge shall dispose of all judicial matters promptly,
efficiently and fairly." (emphasis added). The 2003 amended Commentary to Model Code Canon I
designates "fairness" as an integral part of acting with "integrity". See id. Canon I cmt.
78. See id. at Canon 2.
79.

See CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SPECIAL REPORT DEFENSE

COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES 6 1.10 (2000) (indicating over 75% of all criminal cases result in
convictions, and approximately 71% of all convictions in 1996 were the result of defendants
entering guilty pleas).
80. The active participation of the judiciary in the plea bargaining process may not be
common knowledge. Black's Law Dictionaryprovides an example of the popular understanding of
what constitutes a plea bargain: "A negotiated agreement between a prosecutor and a criminal
defendant whereby the defendant pleads guilty to a lesser offense or to one of multiple charges in
exchange for some concession by the prosecutor, usu[ally] a more lenient sentence or a dismissal of
the other charges." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1173 (7th ed. 1999) (emphasis added).
81. The initial seventeen volumes of the ABA's Standards for Criminal Justice were issued in
1968 and were described by the then-Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court Warren
Burger as "'the single most comprehensive and probably the most monumental undertaking in the
field of criminal justice ever attempted by the American legal profession in our national history."'
ABA NETWORK, CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION STANDARDS (1999). There is a nine-member
Standards Committee responsible for updating the existing standards as well as creating new
volumes relating to issues not previously covered. See id.
82.

See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, CHAPTER 14 - PLEAS OF GUILTY (2d ed. 1986).

83. Prior to 1999, the prosecutor and defense counsel, when unable to reach a plea bargain,
could request a meeting with the judge, and if the judge agreed to meet with counsel, the judge was
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instead, added a new section providing that "[a] judge should not
ordinarily participate in plea negotiation discussions among the
parties., 84 To emphasize the importance of the requirement of judicial
detachment, there is a separate mandate: "A judge should not through
word or demeanor, either directly or indirectly, communicate to the
defendant or defense counsel that a plea agreement should be accepted
or that a guilty plea should be entered., 85 The Commentary to the
Standards is explicit: "These standards reflect the view that direct
judicial involvement in plea discussions
with the parties tends to be
86
allowed.,
be
not
should
and
coercive
Coercive indeed. Take the case of New York Supreme Court Judge
Harold Rothwax, who rather than adjourning the case of one of two codefendants who had no counsel in a burglary case, appointed an attorney
from those who were waiting in the courtroom for other matters to be
called. 87 As soon as the newly-appointed counsel approached the judge's
bench, the judge informed the counsel that the offer in the case, in
exchange for a plea, was a sentence of a minimum prison term of two
years and a maximum of four.88 In a variation of the "for today only"
warning discussed previously, 89 Judge Rothwax had a gradation of
threats: Only for that day was the offer of two-to-four to be valid,
"[a]fler today, it's 3 to 6.''90 But the judge, hardly adhering to the calm
deliberation expected of the judiciary, or to the required presumption of
innocence, 91 then added "after that, it's 4 to 8. "92 And, as if the point was
to act only as "moderator" in order to avoid the coercion that may be seen as accompanying any
judicial involvement. See id
84. PLEAS OF GUILTY, supra note 7, at Standard 14-3.3(d) (emphasis added). This was a
return to the position of the first edition of the ABA Pleas of Guilty Standards that had admonished
the judge not to participate in any way in plea discussions.
85. Id. at Standard 14-3.3(c) (emphasis added).
86. Id. at Standard 14-3.3 cmt.
87. Sam Roberts, For One Zealous Judge, Hard Bargaining Pushes Cases Through the
Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 1985, at BI.
88. See id
89. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
90. Roberts, supra note 87 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Bordenkircher v.
Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 365 n.8 (1978) (expressing a concern that promises given by the prosecutor
can pose a "danger of inducing a false guilty plea by skewing the assessment of the risks a
defendant must consider"). Judicial promises are certainly much more likely than prosecutorial
promises to create such dangers.
91. The "presumption of innocence" is not a mere formality, but rather "express[es] vital
principles of our criminal jurisprudence and criminal procedure." State v. Hardy, 128 S.E. 152, 155
(N.C. 1925).
92. Roberts, supra note 87 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court of Florida,
in considering possible disciplinary action against a judge, observed that judges should never be
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concluded: "If they're ever going to plead,
yet unmade, Judge Rothwax
93
today is the time to do it."
The United States Supreme Court has determined that even subtle
threats void a subsequent plea, 94 and Judge Rothwax was certainly not
making any attempts to be subtle. He, and many throughout the country
like him, 95 violated the ABA Standards instructing judges of their
responsibility in plea cases: "[T]he court should not accept the plea
where it appears the defendant has not had the effective assistance of
counsel. 96 The attorney in this case did not even have any opportunity
to discuss the matter with his client. The Commentary to the Standards
makes it clear that the judge's actions were in violation of ethical
requirements: "[Because] it is seldom possible to engage in effective
negotiations minutes before the defendant is called upon to plead ... a
reasonable interval should elapse between assignment of counsel and the
pleading stage.,

97

Judge Rothwax's actions also violated the Supreme Court mandate
of Chandler v. Warden Fretag98 that the defendant must be provided
with sufficient opportunity to consult with his attorney, "otherwise, the
right to be heard by counsel would be of little worth." 99 Furthermore, the
judge called upon the defendant's lawyer to violate the ABA Defense
Function l ° Standard instructing counsel that he must conduct a full
autocratic or abusive, and added that judges "'are not depositories of arbitrary power, but judges
under the sanction of law."' In re Perry, 641 So. 2d 366, 368-69 (Fla. 1994) (quoting In re Turner,
421 So. 2d 1077, 1081 (Fla. 1982)).
93. See Roberts, supra note 87 (internal quotation marks omitted). The judge was, of course,
aware that the just-appointed counsel had no time to have developed adequate knowledge of the
allegations against his client. The judge, nevertheless, pushed for a plea and violated the
requirement that a plea be entered only after counsel has had the opportunity to assess the facts of
the case which often entails interviewing witnesses. See State v. Draper, 762 P.2d 602, 604-05
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1988), vacated in part by 784 P.2d 259 (Ariz. 1989) (en banc) (holding that there are
times when a defendant may waive the right to question the victim in reaching a plea agreement).
94. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-43 (1969), superseded by FED. R. CRiM. P. 1l(c)
(West 1986 & Supp. 2004) (codifying the plea bargain admonishments stated in Boykin).
95. See, e.g., State v. Gaston, No. 8628, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 5181 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 30,
2003). The trial judge informed the defendant that if he didn't plead guilty and instead went to trial
that he'd be punished, thereby imparting a direct threat that constituted overt and overwhelming
pressure on the defendant to enter a guilty plea. See id. at * 13.
96. PLEAS OF GUILTY, supra note 7, at Standard 14-1.4(d).
97. Id. at Standard 14-1.3 cmt.
98. 348 U.S. 3 (1954).
99. Id. at 10.
100.

PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION, supra note 25, at Standard 4-4.1(a);

see also PLEAS OF GUILTY, supra note 7, at Standard 14-3.2(b) cmt. (defense counsel is required to
conduct an "appropriate investigation" of the case before the defendant enters any plea of guilty).
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investigation and study of the case, including the controlling law' 0 1 and
evidence that is likely to be introduced at trial, before providing any
recommendation concerning a plea.10 2 Our adversary-based system of
justice assumes that each side will have the opportunity to uncover
evidence that's relevant not just as to the guilt or innocence of the
defendant, but to the determination of the appropriate sentence as well.
Prosecutors notoriously over-charge and may engage in "bluffing"; how
can defense counsel possibly call the bluff if there's no opportunity to
investigate the allegations?
Judge Rothwax's concern was simply complying with the
technicality that a living being with a Juris Doctor degree stand next to
the defendant in court.' 0 3 The presence of an attorney constituted, in the
court's eyes, a mere legal formality, a precondition for the court's efforts
to obtain the desired plea.1°4 The attempt was to co-opt the attorney, to
have the lawyer act as a mere assistant in the rapidly-moving assembly
line, and in doing so to redefine the role of counsel so that the whole
process would have the appearance of legitimacy. 0 5 But the very reason
101. See United States v. Loughery, 908 F.2d 1014, 1018-19 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (finding
ineffective assistance of counsel where counsel failed to become familiar with the applicable state
of the law, including recent court decisions that may have affected their clients' interests); Herring
v. Estelle, 491 F.2d 125, 128 (5th Cir. 1974) (counsel is obligated to know the elements and case
law applicable to the charges against his client and to communicate that information to his client);
State v. Whitmore, No. 20020471-CA, 2003 WL 22510937, at *[-*2 (Utah Ct. App. 2003)
(unpublished opinion) (counsel's error about the lack of a valid legal defense available to the
defendant constituted ineffective assistance).
102. See PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION, supra note 25, at Standard 46.1(b). In order for an attorney to provide effective counseling for his client he must provide the
defendant with an "'understanding of the law in relation to the facts."' Walker v. Caldwell, 476 F.2d
213, 218 (5th Cir. 1973) (quoting McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969), superseded
by FED. R. CRIM. P. 1 (h) (West. 1986 & Supp. 2004)).
103. See United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196, 219 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (MacKinnon, J.,
concurring) Judge MacKinnon reasoned that:
The Sixth Amendment ... guarantees more than the appointment of competent counsel.
By its terms, one has a right to "Assistance of Counsel [for] his defense." Assistance
begins with the appointment of counsel, it does not end there. In some cases the
performance of counsel may be so inadequate that, in effect, no assistance of counsel is
provided. Clearly, in such cases, the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to "have
Assistance of Counsel" is denied.
Id.
104. Whereas the general rule is that an individual cannot appeal a conviction obtained as a
result of a voluntarily entered plea of guilty, a plea which has been given without the effective
assistance of counsel may be successfully attacked in a post-conviction proceeding. See, e.g.,
Loughery, 908 F.2d at 1018-19 (failing to provide the defendant with effective assistance of counsel
was sufficient grounds for the withdrawal of the guilty plea).
105. A lawyer who complies with a judge's "request," such as the one at issue in the case
under examination, subjects himself to possible disciplinary proceedings. See, e.g., Holt v. Whelan,
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that counsel is required is to avoid just the type of perfunctory process
that this judge had created. 10 6 The requirement to provide an indigent
defendant with counsel is not met when the assignment occurs under
circumstances precluding counsel from providing effective assistance.
The very reason that the appointment of counsel for indigents is
mandatory whenever a conviction threatens the defendant with the loss
of liberty 10 7 is because the Court was concerned that, without such a
mandate, the heavy volume of cases "may create an obsession for speedy
dispositions, regardless of the fairness of the result.' 0 8 The Court further
explained that
[b]eyond the problem of trials and appeals, is that of the guilty plea, a
problem which looms large in misdemeanor as well as in felony cases.
Counsel is needed so that the accused may know precisely what he is
doing, so that he is fully aware of the prospect of going
to jail or
10 9
prison, and so that he is treated fairly by the prosecution.

The United States Supreme Court should have added "and by the judge."
When there is no actual assistance rendered by counsel, the
constitutional guarantee to counsel has clearly been violated. 10° In the
199 N.W.2d 195, 196 (Mich. 1972) (averring that the disciplinary action taken against the attorney
was a result of his inadequate analysis of "the failure of the trial court.., to observe the
constitutional, statutory and court rule requirements in taking a guilty plea").
106. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 34 (1972).
107. See id. at 37-38. The first instance where the Supreme Court held that an indigent had a
fight to appointed counsel was in Powell v. Alabama. 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932). The Court explained
that "[t]he right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the fight
to be heard by counsel.... [The defendant] requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the
proceedings against him." Id. at 68-69. Powell's holding was limited, however, and only applied to
requiring the appointment of counsel for an indigent being tried for a capital offense. See id. at 71.
108. Argersinger,407 U.S. at 34.
109. Id. In Johnson v. Zerbst, the Court held that all indigents in federal court who were
charged with a felony had a Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 304 U.S. 458, 468 (1938). It was not
until Gideon v. Wainwright, however, that the Court applied the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to felony prosecutions in state courts. 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963). The Court
in Gideon explained that
in our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor
to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him. .... The
right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental and essential
to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours. From the very beginning, our state and
national constitutions and laws have laid great emphasis on procedural and substantive
safeguards designed to assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in which every
defendant stands equal before the law. This noble ideal cannot be realized if the poor man
charged with crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer to assist him.
Id. at 344.
110. The fight to the assistance of counsel is one of those few, basic constitutional rights that
have been held to be "so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as harmless
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court case examined previously where the judge appointed counsel for
the defendant from the group of attorneys who were in the courtroom
and then exerted pressure for an immediate plea,"' the judge had made it
impossible for any attorney, however able, to have provided effective
112
assistance of counsel. Effective counsel are "necessities not luxuries,"'
and "the right to be represented by counsel is by far the most pervasive
for it affects [the defendant's] ability to assert any other rights he may
have."" 3 When the Court stated that counsel's "presence is essential,"" 4
the Court most certainly did not mean just a live body with a J.D. degree
standing next to the defendant as the judge bellowed "today, 2 to 4...
after today, it's 3 to 6 ... after that, it's 4 to 8.'' ..
The need for rapid processing of cases notwithstanding, there are
two qualities that are vital attributes of any distinguished judge: patience
and fairness. A jurist must be sufficiently patient with attorneys in order
to fully consider their arguments. Only then is it possible for the judge to
evaluate counsel's claims and adjudicate the issues fairly and properly.
The knowledge to determine what outcome would be most just can only
be obtained after there is careful examination of the merits of the
positions of each side. Such patience and fairness is all the more
necessary when an individual's liberty is at stake.
The judge's responsibility to ensure that the defendant's appointed
counsel does, in fact, effectively represent the defendant who wishes to
enter a guilty plea, is all the greater after the Supreme Court's decision
in Hill v. Lockhart. 1 6 The Court had, years earlier in Kercheval v.
United States, 17 held that in order for a guilty plea to be constitutionally
valid, the plea must be "made voluntarily after proper advice and with
full understanding of the consequences."" 8 The standard for assessing
error." See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967), overruled in part by Brecht v.
Abramson, 507 U.S. 619, 637-38 (1993). In general, an error committed by the trial court will be

deemed harmless and therefore not lead to a reversal of a conviction if it is determined that the error
did not contribute to the conviction. See Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 (1963). But see
Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 487 (1978) (indicating that some courts consider the right to
counsel as being too fundamental to permit courts to engage in calculations to determine the amount
of prejudice that occurred due to its denial).
111.
112.

See Roberts, supra note 87; see also supra notes 87-93 and accompanying text.
Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.

113.

United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 653 (1984) (quoting Walter V. Schaefer,

Federalismand State CriminalProcedure,70 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1956)).
114. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 653 (emphasis added).

115.

See supranotes 89-95 and accompanying text.

116.
117.
118.

474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).
274 U.S. 220 (1927).
Id. at 223.
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counsel's effectiveness when a plea of guilty was entered was set forth
in McMann v. Richardson. 19 The validity of the plea was to be
determined by examining whether the representation provided by
counsel was "within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in
criminal cases."' 120 However, the Court in Hill imposed the additional
requirement that the defendant on appeal must demonstrate that "there is
a reasonable probability that, [were it not for his attorney's] errors, he
would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to
trial''
Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court emphasized that
because the vast majority of criminal convictions arise from guilty pleas,
the need for finality in judgment was particularly great. 122 The Court
stated that, "we believe that requiring a showing of 'prejudice' from
defendants who seek to challenge the validity of their guilty pleas on the
ground of ineffective assistance of counsel
will serve the fundamental
' 23
interestin the finality of guilty pleas."'

The standard set forth in Hill for a defendant to successfully
challenge a plea bargain is an exceptionally demanding one. 124 Once the

119. 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
120. Id at 771. Vague, generalized standards, such as this, for assessing the effectiveness of
counsel have historically been the norm. See, e.g., Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325, 1330 (9th
Cir. 1978) (stating that the assistance by counsel should be that of a "reasonably competent attorney
acting as a diligent conscientious advocate"); United States v. Easter, 539 F.2d 663, 666 (8th Cir.
1976) (requiring counsel to "exercise the customary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent
attorney would perform under similar circumstances").
121. Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. When the defendant has entered a guilty plea and there's been no
trial, the burden on defendant to show ineffective assistance is increased. See Coon v. Weber, 644
N.W.2d 638, 643 (S.D. 2002). The defendant must show not just deficient performance but gross
error by the attorney in advising the plea of guilty. See id.
122. See Hill, 474 U.S. at 58. For a rather unusual instance where a Circuit Court of Appeals
criticizes a decision of the Supreme Court, see United States v. Arvanitis. 902 F.2d 489, 494 n.4
(7th Cir. 1990), superseded by 18 U.S.C.A. § 3663 (West 2000) ("The majority opinion in
Hill... is not well reasoned.... We therefore join in the minority's criticism of the Hill opinion.").
123. See Hill, 474 U.S. at 58 (emphasis added).
124. The requirement that the defendant show "prejudice" ought not to exist at all in instances
where the court prohibits counsel from having the opportunity to engage in any fact investigation or
preparation for his client's case. Courts have found constitutional error when counsel was prevented
from providing assistance to his client during a critical stage of the proceeding, and the entrance of a
plea of guilty is most certainly a "critical stage." See, e.g., Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 91
(1976) (finding that the night before defendant was to be cross-examined in his criminal trial was
critical and denying defendant access to his counsel during that time violated his rights under the
Sixth Amendment); Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 612-13 (1972) (finding that a Tennessee
law that requires a testifying defendant to testify first denied the defendant of the effective
assistance of counsel); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 55 (1961) (finding that an arraignment is
a critical stage); Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 598 (1961) (finding that the presentation of the
defense to the court is a critical stage).
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defendant has entered the guilty plea there will ordinarily be no appellate
review of counsel's preparation of the case. The overburdened public
defender knows, therefore, that if his client pleads guilty, counsel will
not be examined as to what investigation or preparation he may have
done or failed to have done on his client's case.
The general reluctance of appellate courts to overturn guilty pleas is
illustrated by the case of Parrishv. Beto. 125 The defendant had been a
young, uneducated boy, incarcerated for six months on a capital charge
at the time the district attorney threatened the boy with being "burned"
on the electric chair if he chose to go to trial, and his counsel pressured
him to plead to a sentence of ninety-nine years.' 26 The Fifth Circuit, in
spite of the prosecutor's threat to the defendant of what could happen
were he not to plead guilty, nevertheless deemed the plea to be
27
voluntary.
The primary objective of our criminal justice system must be
fairness and justice, not finality and judicial economy. Is it just or fair to
inform a defendant who was represented by a counsel so overwhelmed
with cases operating in a system "in which the need simply to dispose of
cases has overshadowed everything else"' 128 that he has no recourse
129
because of the "fundamental interest in the finality of guilty pleas"?
The Tenth Circuit in Sanchez v. Mondragon'30 quite accurately
portrayed reality: "Given the well-known overworked state of many
public defenders, it is possible that [the defendant's] lawyer was
insufficiently prepared, and that his attempts to persuade [the defendant]
to plead guilty were affected by his lack of preparation.' 3' In the recent

125.

414 F.2d 770 (5th Cir. 1969) (per curiam).

126.

Seeid.at771.

127. See id.
at 771-72.
128. CRIMINAL COURTS COMM. OF THE ASSOC. OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK,
SAVING THE CRIMINAL CODE: A REPORT ON THE CASELOAD CRISIS AND ABSENCE OF TRIAL

CAPACITY IN THE CRIMINAL COURT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 2 (1983) [hereinafter REPORT ON
THE CASELOAD CRISIS].

129. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985). Twenty years earlier, the Court favored the
rights of the individual over the need for finality: "[C]onventional notions of finality ... cannot be
permitted to defeat.., constitutional rights of personal liberty... without the fullest opportunity for
plenary federal judicial review." Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 424 (1963), overruled by Keeney v.

Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 4 (1992), superseded by Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) (West 1994 & Supp. 2004); see also Townsend v. Sam, 372 U.S.
293, 311-12 (1963), overruled by Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 4 (1992), superseded by

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) (West 1994 & Supp.
2004).
130. 858 F.2d 1462 (10th Cir. 1988).
131.

Id. at 1466-67.
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case of United States v. Bliss,13 2 the Ninth Circuit held that a guilty plea
which is entered by the defendant because his counsel's lack of
preparation made conviction likely, was involuntary and invalid.133
Proving prejudice to courts that desire finality is most difficultespecially given the sparseness of the record when the plea is offered.
The Hill requirement, that in order for a defendant to get relief from a
plea bargain in which he was denied effective assistance he must
establish the reasonable likelihood that he would otherwise have gone to
trial and perhaps have been acquitted, 134 negates the many significant
ways a defendant can suffer from inadequate counsel. True plea
negotiations should often be as adversarial as a trial itself, counsel must
aggressively attempt to obtain the most advantageous plea bargain for
his client. The factual investigation required, but so often not done, in
part because the judge does not permit counsel to have the time to do so,
can be crucial to* counsel's ability to present the most positive
information about the defendant and the charge to both the prosecutor
and the court. 35 Furthermore, an abbreviated court transcript of the plea
hearing will not reveal what a thorough investigation would have
uncovered,1 36 nor will it reveal what weaknesses in the prosecution's
case that competent counsel, given enough time, may have discovered
by interviewing both defense and prosecution witnesses. We are left by
the Lockhart decision with a most unfortunate result: in the vast majority
of instances where an effective, competent counsel could have
negotiated a better plea for the defendant than his incompetent counsel
did, there will be no remedy.
132. No. 02-56362, 84 Fed. Appx. 820, 822 (9th Cir. 2003) (unpublished mem.).
133. See id. On the day that Bliss' trial was to begin, his counsel was unprepared because
counsel had not conducted the investigation that was required. The refusal of the court to grant a
continuance presented the defendant with "a Hobson's choice: proceed to trial with unprepared
counsel and risk a life sentence or plead guilty and receive a lesser sentence." Id.
134. See supranote 123 and accompanying text.
135. See Adele Bernhard, Take Courage: What the Courts Can Do to Improve the Delivery of
Criminal Defense Services, 63 U. PiTT. L. REv. 293, 344 (2002) (The pre-trial work of counsel is
crucial, including determining what had really occurred, who the witnesses are and what was
actually observed, and such pre-trial effort "is the only key to a favorable disposition.").
136. See Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227, 229 (1971) (acknowledging that, at the
very least, a transcript is valuable before trial as a discovery tool and after trial as an impeachment
tool). Courts have recognized that there must be funds allocated to provide indigent defendants with
investigative assistance to ensure effective assistance of counsel. See id. at 227. Cf Smith v.
Enomoto, 615 F.2d 1251, 1252 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that an indigent defendant must make a
showing of need in order to show entitlement to "state-funded investigative services"); see also
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691 (1984) (requiring counsel to conduct reasonable
investigations or to make a reasonable decision that a particular investigation is unnecessary).
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Judges' attempts to get the defendant to plead guilty quickly by
offering a shorter prison sentence than what would be imposed after trial
ignores the substantial collateral consequences that may impact a
defendant who accepts the plea bargain. 137 Judges very rarely inform a
defendant that accepting the "one-time offer" might affect his
livelihood; 138 that the imposition of civil damages will become more
likely; that he might be required to register as a sex offender;' 39 that he
may be subject to mandatory substance abuse testing; 140 that he and his
family might be denied access to governmental benefits such as public
assistance funds; 14 1 that he may no longer be eligible to live in public
housing; 42 and in most states as a convicted felon he would lose his
right to vote. 143 For some individuals, the most serious consequence
would be a change in immigration status including the possibility of
deportation. 144 Courts fail to take the time to inform defendants of these
137. For example, the failure to be aware of the consequences of entry into a guilty plea
procured by misrepresentation results in the vacatur of the plea. See Bettancourt v. Willis. 814 F.2d
1546, 1549 (llth Cir. 1987). However, there is no constitutional requirement that the possible
consequences of a plea that are collateral as opposed to direct be explained to the defendant. See
United States v. Gilliam, No. 95 Cr. 387, 1996 U.S. Dist. Lexis 15314, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.
17,1996); United States v. U.S. Currency, 895 F.2d 908, 915 (2d Cir. 1990).
138. Many states have mandatory license revocations for individuals convicted of felonies and
certain jobs are not available for felons even if no prison time resulted from the conviction. See,
e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 2221(d) (West 2003). For example, licenses which often are
foreclosed to felons are required in many states in order to become a teacher, day care worker, real
estate salesman, home repairman, liquor store or restaurant operator, a variety of positions within
the health care field, or positions with banks or insurance companies. See PLEAS OF GUILTY, supra
note 7, at Standard 14-1.4 cmt.
139. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-11-200 (1994); CAL. PENAL CODE § 290 (West 1999). An
increasing number of states are requiring registration and public dissemination of the conviction for
individuals convicted of an ever-increasing list of offenses. This has many ramifications for the
convicted individual, not the least of which is the increased difficulty in obtaining employment.
140. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-251.01 (1996) (requiring substance abuse screening and
assessment for individuals convicted of felonies).
141. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-76-409(b) (2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 44:10-48(b)(7)
(West Supp. 2004). Many states prohibit individuals convicted of drug offenses from receiving aid
from state programs such as food stamps or assistance for dependent children. See PLEAS OF
GUILTY, supra note 7, Standard 14-1.4 cmt.
142. The entire household may be evicted from federally-funded public housing if any member
of the household is convicted of a drug offense. See 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(1) (2004).
143. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. II, § 4 (West 2002); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 97.041 (West 2002).
The impact of the loss of vote has meant that minority communities in particular have diminished
political power due to the over-representation of minorities amongst the population of convicted
felons.
144. The 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act Amendments to the Immigration
and Normality Act contains provisions which have widespread impact on non-citizens who are
convicted of felonies. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1227(a)(2) (West 1999).
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consequences even though the court is constitutionally required to
inform the defendant of all direct consequences of any guilty plea. 145 As
the court explained in United States ex rel. McGrath v. LaVallee, 146 "a
fair description of the consequences attendant upon the prisoner's choice
of plea.. . [is] manifestly
essential to an informed decision on the part
147
of the prisoner.'
Defendants are not fungible, they are not just cogs in the criminal
court assembly line. Unique issues and particular concerns of specific
defendants must be understood by both the court and defense counsel;
such awareness requires time. Judges, all too typically, not only refuse to
devote sufficient time for themselves to get the required information
about the defendant, but also refuse to permit counsel to conduct the
investigation required to obtain the data. 148 The proper determination of
an appropriate sentence, whether imposed after a plea pre-trial or postconviction at trial, requires consideration of factors such as any record of
drug addiction that might lead to the realization that a drug rehabilitation
program and not incarceration ought to be part of the sentence, the
defendant's psychiatric history, employment record, prior involvement
with the victim, family responsibilities, and a myriad of other factors
that properly bear on the determination of the most-appropriate
sanction. 149
The Supreme Court has been explicit in emphasizing the
responsibilities of the trial judge toward the defendant in a criminal case.
In Glasser v. United States,150 the Court stated that "[u]pon the trial
judge rests the duty of seeing that the trial is conducted with solicitude
for the essential rights of the accused."' 151 The Court almost thirty years
145.

See Aguirre-Mata v. State, 125 S.W.3d 473, 485 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (Holcomb, J.,

dissenting) (explaining that "[a] consequence is direct if it is a definite, practical consequence of a
defendant's guilty plea") When the judge's offer does not include incarceration, the defendant may
be all the more unaware of the consequences that may nevertheless occur.
146. 319 F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1963).
147. Id. at 314.

148. See PLEAS OF GUILTY, supra note 7, Standard 14-3.2(a) cmt. (requiring counsel to
conduct sufficient investigation so as to be able to provide the individualized consideration required
in order to give meaningful advice regarding a possible plea).
149. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(d) (1993). Appellate courts rarely determine that a sentence is
improper; trial judges have broad discretion as long as the sentence imposed is within statutory
limits. There is considered to be a strong public policy opposing interference with the trial court's
discretion in sentencing. See, e.g., State v. Echols, 499 N.W. 2d 631, 640 (Wis. 1993).
150.

315 U.S. 60 (1942).

151. Id. at 71. In Cordova v. Baca, the failure of the trial judge to admonish the defendant
appropriately as to the dangers and disadvantages inherent in waiving counsel and choosing to
represent oneself automatically led to a reversal of the conviction. 346 F.3d 924, 930 (9th Cir.
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later, in McMann v. Richardson,152 again highlighted the significance of
the judge's function: "[I]f the right to counsel guaranteed by the
Constitution is to serve its purpose, defendants cannot be left to the
mercies of incompetent counsel, and... judges should strive to maintain
proper standards of performance by attorneys
who are representing
153
defendants in criminal cases in their courts.'

The ABA places similar responsibilities upon the trial judge 1in
54
Standards for Criminal Justice: Special Functions of the Trial Judge.
The very first of the "Basic Duties" charges the judge with the
responsibility of safeguarding the rights of the accused. 155 The Standard
continues with language that almost seems designed to warn judges not
156
to proceed as we have seen judges do regarding the coercion of pleas:
"The trial judge should require that every proceeding before him or her
be conducted with unhurried and quiet dignity . ,,157 The Standard's
language seems not even to contemplate that it would, in fact, be the
judge and not counsel who was "hurried" and not acting with the
requisite and expected "quiet dignity.' ' 158 Yet in one respect it does seem
as if the Basic Duties of the Trial Judge had been written in an attempt
to directly respond to the way some judges coerce defendants to decide
2003). Even if the reason for the court's failure was mere oversight on the part of the judge,
overturning of the conviction is mandated. See id.
152. 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
153. Id. at 771; see also Braxton v. Peyton, 365 F.2d 563, 564 (4th Cir. 1966) (acknowledging
that "[c]ourts have a duty of vigilance to assure that appointed counsel shall give proper
professional service to their indigent clients"). Some judges may possess distorted perceptions about
what is proper representation . In State v. Huskey, the defendant was charged with four counts of
first degree murder and faced the death penalty. 82 S.W.3d 297, 302 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2002). The
trial judge, citing his authority to monitor court-appointed counsel for indigent defendants, removed
and replaced defendant's counsel because counsel had made too many motions which were
"unnecessarily lengthy," "repetitive," and "duplicitous." Id.at 302-03. The discharged counsel had,
the judge maintained, filed an "unprecedented number of pleadings in this multi-faceted case." Id. at

303.
154. ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: SPECIAL
FUNCTIONS OF THE TRIAL JUDGE (3d ed. 2000) [hereinafter SPECIAL FUNCTIONS].

155. Id. at Standard 6-1.1.
156. See, e.g., supra notes 2 and 3 and accompanying text.
157.

SPECIAL FUNCTIONS, supra note 154, at Standard 6-1.1(b) (emphasis added). The judge

also has the obligation to be patient and courteous to the defendant. Id. at Standard 6-3.4.
158. It would appear that the Standards contemplate that the judge would be the individual who
reigns in the unruly counsel, as contrasted to the judge actually creating the improper courtroom
atmosphere. The judge ought to control the tone of the courtroom and "ensure that the proceedings
are conducted with dignity" and "do everything within his or her power to require that the lawyers
treat each other with courtesy and respect. Although the trial judge cannot be expected to monitor
the behavior of attorneys outside his or her presence, inquiry and admonition are warranted when
complaints are made." Id.at Standard 6-1.1(b) cmt.
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whether to accept in a matter of minutes pleas which are offered "for
today only." One Standard instructs the judge to engage in conduct
toward the defendant which manifests "professional respect, courtesy,
60
and fairness."' 59 The Supreme Court mandate in Sheppard v. Maxwell1
that "trial courts must take strong measures to ensure that the balance is
never weighed against the accused"'16 1 certainly ought to operate to
prevent the judge himself from becoming instrumental in causing the
balance to be "weighed against the accused."
If the message that comes from the judge is that time is all that
counts and that speed in the processing of cases is all-important, 162 then
the whole system and all its participants can become diseased. The
prosecutor may well not have the opportunity to fully assess the strength
of his case, and in some instances, the police report the prosecutor is
forced to rely on is exaggerated, may contain distortions, or omit vital
information. Yet, it is this police report that forms the basis of the
prosecutor's or judge's plea offer to the defendant. Is the defendant, who
has been assigned counsel by a court whose first words are to convey the
judge's one-time offer, truly to believe that he has had the effective
assistance of counsel? And since so many minorities pass through the
criminal courts of our country, might those individuals perceive the
courts as simply unconcerned with their constitutional rights because of
their color or ethnicity? A defendant may expect partiality from the
prosecution, but shouldn't have to expect it from the judge. Furthermore,
the lawyer who just does the judge's bidding' 63 delivers the defendantclient a one-two punch, a lesson in how the system is stacked against
him.
The Supreme Court has made it clear that the judge at times has the
affirmative obligation to intervene in the adversarial proceedings in
159. Id.at Standard 6-1.1(c). It is not just the defendant to whom the judge must offer respect,
the judge must also treat the defense attorney with "courtesy, fairness, and respect." Id.
160.

384 U.S. 333 (1966).

161.

Id.at362.

162. See Albert W. Alschuler, Courtroom Misconduct by Prosecutors and Trial Judges, 50

TEX. L. REv. 629, 678 (1972) (arguing that our "nation seems to have done its best to divert its trial
judges from their naturally reflective role and to convert them into traffic policemen. At least we
have placed most of our judges at very busy intersections").
163. The decision of whether to plead guilty is that of the defendant and the defendant alone.
See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-7 (1986) [hereinafter PROF'L RESPONSIBILITy].
The ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct are not quite as explicit regarding pleas
specifically, but Rule 1.2(a) states that "[a] lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the
objectives of representation." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2003), available at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/mrpc_home.html.
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order to protect the rights of the defendant. In Batson v. Kentucky,1 64 the
Court emphasized the trial court's responsibility to prevent the use of
166
1 65
peremptory challenges for discriminatory goals. In Fludd v. Dykes,
the Eleventh Circuit extended the holding in Batson to civil cases and
made it clear that by permitting counsel to act in a discriminatory
manner, the court itself "becomes guilty" of violating the Equal
Protection Clause.1 67 The Supreme Court's decisions relating to possible
conflict of interests cases present other examples. In Cuyler v.
Sullivan, 168 the Court declared that an attorney must advise the trial court
of any conflict of interest that arises during his representation of two or
more clients, and that the court then has the duty to intervene. The
Supreme Court explained in Holloway v. Arkansas169 that the obligation
to intervene arises because "[u]pon the trial judge rests the duty of
seeing that the trial is170conducted with the solicitude for the essential
rights of the accused."'
The extreme example of the responsibility of the trial court to act
on the defendant's behalf is when the court is obligated to act sua
sponte, even if counsel for the defendant objects. The trial court is
obliged to "protect a defendant's right not to be tried or convicted while
incompetent to stand trial" 17 1 whenever and however the court has
information that creates a reasonable doubt as to the competency of the
defendant. 172 If a judge fails to meet this obligation, the defendant has
been deprived of due process because the trial would not have been a
fair one. 173 In the plea context, the judge is too often the cause of the
denial of due process and too infrequently the protector of the rights of
the defendant. 7 4 In Stano v. Dugger, 75 the dissent emphasized the need
for the court to intervene when required:
164. 476 U.S. 79 (1986), overruled in part by Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 (1995) (per
curiam) and Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
165. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 99 & n.22.
166. 863 F.2d 822 (11th Cir. 1989).
167. Id. at 828.
168. 446 U.S. 335, 347-48 (1980).
169. 435 U.S. 475 (1978).
170. Id. at 484 (quoting Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 71 (1942)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
171. Fallada v. Dugger, 819 F.2d 1564, 1568 (11 th Cir. 1987).
172. See Lokos v. Capps. 625 F.2d 1258, 1261 (5th Cir. 1980).
173. See id.
174. Compare, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465 (1938) (discussing the protective
function of the trial court vis-6-vis the defendant), overruled by Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477,
484-85 (1981) with the discussion supranotes 87-93 and accompanying text.
175. 921 F.2d 1125 (11 th Cir. 1991).

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol32/iss4/14

26

Klein: Due Process Denied: Judicial Coercion in the Plea Bargaining Proc

2004]

DUE PROCESS DENIED

When a trial judge receives notice of a circumstance or event
implicating the fairness of a proceeding before the court, he assumes a
responsibility to intervene in order to preserve the proceeding's
fairness. If the trial judge fails to discharge this duty,
then he becomes
76
causally responsible for the error and its effects. 1
Judges are, of course, required not only to be familiar with the
canons and codes which are applicable to the trial judge, 177 but must
conform their conduct to the specific ethical rules governing the
judiciary. 178 Therefore, the judge's statements ought to reflect not only
the "dignity of judicial office"' 179 but must also "carefully avoid any
' 80
words or actions that could undermine the dignity of the proceedings."'
It is impossible to maintain that the "for today only" style of judging
conforms to the mandate that the trial judge "must be careful to allow
sufficient time" for the defense to "properly prepare their case.''
Judges who treat defendants with a minimum amount of respect or
dignity are perhaps similar to the judge in In re Yengo, 182 who was
described by the New Jersey Supreme Court upon removing the judge
from office, as being
unable to understand the relationship between justice and the
defendant. The poorest, weakest, most hapless or illiterate defendant,
standing before an American Court, is entitled to exactly the same
respect, rights and hearing as would be the Chief Justice of the United
States standing before the court and similarly accused. This isyart of
what our Constitution means by "equal protection of the laws."
There are two other significant ways that the coercion of pleas
violates judicial codes of conduct. The judge who assesses a case he sees
for the first time in a matter of moments and then concludes what the
outcome should be with no or minimum input from defense counsel,

176. Id. at 1158 (Tjoflat, C.J., dissenting).
177. See SPECIAL FUNCTIONS, supra note 154, at Standard 6-1.3. The Standard is titled,
Adherence to Standards, and is one sentence in length: "The trial judge should be familiar with and
adhere to the canons and codes applicable to the judiciary, the ethical rules effective in the particular
jurisdiction applicable to the legal profession, and standards concerning the proper administration of
criminal justice."
178. Id. at Standard 6-1.3 cmt.
179. Id.at Standard 6-1.4.
180. Id.at Standard 6-1.4 cmt.
181. Id. at Standard 6-1.5(a) cmt. See supra notes 87-93 and related discussion regarding the
judge telling counsel that the time was up.
182. 371 A.2d41 (N.J. 1977).
183. Id.at 56-57.
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violates the requirement that "[t]he trial judge should give each case
individual treatment; and the judge's decisions should be based on the
particular facts of that case."1 84 It is all too often what the court itself
actually does that may leave the impression that the criminal process is
mechanical and that there is no individual justice. The judge is not just
the bystander to the lack of individualized justice, but all too often, the
judge is a major player and, in many ways, the major cause.
Furthermore, the judge who threatens the defendant in order to get
him to plead guilty to criminal conduct is no longer acting as the
requisite "neutral" figure. 185 As an Ohio Court of Appeals stated so
forcefully in Ohio v. Filchock: 86 "It stretches the appearance of

neutrality past the breaking point for a trial court to usurp the role of the
prosecutor by formulating and proposing a plea bargain, and neither 'Ithe
7
State nor the Federal Constitutions will countenance such a practice." 8
The Criminal Justice Standards properly link the requirement of
judicial impartiality with public confidence in the integrity of the
judiciary.188 Judges certainly lose the appearance of objectivity and
impartiality when they take on the role of advocate and pressure
defendants to plead guilty and not to contest the charges against them. 89
As the court stated in Bethany v. State,190 "[w]here a trial judge
abandons his position as a neutral arbiter and takes on 19the
role of an
1
advocate, this system cannot function and fairness is lost.'

Judicial pressure may even be directed to the defendant's family
members. One judge in Ohio requested that the defendant's mother and

184.

SPECIAL FUNCTIONS, supra note 156, at Standard 6-1.1(b).

185. Id. at Standard 6-3.4. The Standard also requires that the judge "suppress personal
predilections" and not permit himself to get "embroil[ed]" in the conflict. Id. The Commentary is
even stronger: "The judge should not demonstrate even a hint of partiality." Id. at Standard 6-3.4
cmt.
186.
187.

688 N.E.2d 1063 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996).
Id. at 1067; see also State v. Delarosa, 547 A.2d 47, 51 (Conn. App. Ct. 1988) (asserting

that the court "should never assume a position of advocacy, real or apparent").
188. See SPECIAL FUNCTIONS, supra note 156, at Standard 6-1.6(a). The Commentary
highlights the need for the judge to appear to be impartial and instructs the judge to "remain alert"

as to whether any action by the judge may even create the "appearance of partiality." Id. at
Standard 6-1.6(a) cmt. (emphasis added).
189.

See Filchock, 688 N.E.2d at 1067; Delarosa, 547 A.2d at 51. The plea of guilty requires

that the defendant waive his constitutional right to a jury trial. The Supreme Court explained that
"[a] waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or
privilege." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938), overruled by Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S.
477, 484-85 (1981).
190. 814 S.W.2d 455 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991).
191. Id. at 462.
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sister meet with the judge outside of the presence of either the defendant
or his counsel. 192 The defendant in the case was black and the judge told
the family that if the defendant were to insist on going to trial he would
face a predominately white jury, and, were a conviction to ensue, the
defendant's sentence would be death. 193 The judge asked the family to
request the defendant to sign a statement indicating that he wished to
plead guilty. 194 The family members acquiesced and, in the absence of
his counsel, but in the presence of95the prosecutor, the plea bargain was
arranged in the judge's chambers.'
Judges may, in fact, be torn between their desire to get the plea and
their knowledge that the coercion needed at times to get the plea might
be inappropriate. 196 But the court's message, however masked, is often
quite clear. Consider the trial judge in United States ex rel. McGrath v.
LaVallee. 197 The judge told the defendant: 1) that the plea which was
offered was "very, very fair,"' 98 2) that the chance of any acquittal at
trial was "not too good,"' 199 3) that he would not be entitled to any kind
of favorable consideration were he to be convicted, 20 0 and 4) that the
judge "might have to send you away for the rest of your life.,' 20 1 "But,"
the judge then added, cavalierly, "I emphasize that I am not telling you
192. See State v. Byrd, 407 N.E.2d 1384, 1385-86 (Ohio 1980).
193. See id. at 1386. The judge had, in actuality, the discretion to impose either a prison
sentence or the death penalty after conviction.
194. See id. Theoretically, pressure from family members on a defendant to plead guilty will
not make a plea involuntary or coerced. See Kent v. United States, 272 F.2d 795, 798 (1959).
However, where, as was the case here, the source of the threat to the defendant was easily traceable
back to the court, due process would be violated. See Lo Conte v. Dugger, 847 F.2d 745, 753 (11 th
Cir. 1988).
195. See Byrd, 407 N.E.2d at 1386. The plea bargain was voided because of the intense
pressure that the judge placed upon the defendant. See id. at 1389. However, the court in its decision
retreated from its prior holding in State v. Griffey that under no circumstances should a judge
partake in plea negotiations. See id. at 1388 (modifying Griffey, 298 N.E. 2d 603, 610 (Ohio 1973)).
The Byrd rule adopted by the court required careful scrutiny, and condemnation in only some
instances, of judicial participation in plea bargaining See Michael A. Hiser, Comment, Judicial
Participationin Plea Bargaining-FundamentalFairness?8 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 212 (1981).
196. The Model Code of Judicial Conduct is not always understanding of the conflicting
demands on judges. The Code, at times, seems to have been written with the belief that judges can
do it all. For example, the Commentary to Standard 3B(4) informs that, "The duty to hear all
proceedings fairly and with patience is not inconsistent with the duty to dispose promptly of the
business of the court. Judges can be efficient and businesslike while being patient and deliberate."
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 1, at Canon 3B(4) cmt.

197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

319 F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1963).
Id. at 323 app. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id.
See id. at 324 app. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 323 app. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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what to do son., 20 2 What is crucial, in any event, is not whether the
judge's comments were deliberately designed to induce the guilty plea,
the issue is whether the judge's statements to the defendant have that
impact.203

Although the Supreme Court in Brady v. United States204 has
upheld the overall constitutionality of plea bargaining, the Court, in
United States v. Jackson,205 declared unequivocally that "due process
forbids convicting a defendant on the basis of a coerced guilty plea. 20 6
A plea which has been induced by threats is deprived of its requisite
voluntariness.20 7 The Jackson Court held the death penalty clause of the
Federal Kidnaping Act20 8 to be unconstitutional in that the only time the
death sentence could be imposed under the statute was if the defendant
refused to plead guilty and was convicted after a jury trial. 20 9 The Court
elaborated on its prohibition of coerced guilty pleas: "[T]he evil in the
federal statute is not that it necessarily coerces guilty pleas and jury
waivers but simply that it needlessly encourages them. A procedure
an
need not be inherently coercive in order that it be held to impose
2 10
impermissible burden upon the assertion of a constitutional right.,
State courts have, albeit infrequently, also condemned the
"punishment" of an individual for the exercise of his right to a jury trial.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina remanded a case for re-sentencing
because the trial judge had stated in open court that the sentence he was
imposing was in response to the defendant's insisting on a jury trial, and
forcefully explained the basis of its decision:
No other right of the individual has been so zealously guarded over the
years and so deeply embedded in our system of jurisprudence as an
accused's right to a jury trial. This right ought not to be denied or
202. Id. at 324 app. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). This is evocative of the New
York State Supreme Court judge in People v. Derrick Smith, who told the defendant that he was
"not obligated to accept" the plea which had been offered. See supra note 3 and accompanying text
203. See United States ex rel. Elksnis v. Gilligan, 256 F. Supp. 244, 253 (1966).
204. 397 U.S. 742, 746, 753 (1970) (holding that merely because the defendant was motivated
to accept a specific penalty rather than be subjected to a greater sentence after trial did not, in and of
itself, cause the plea to be involuntary or coerced). The Court deemed plea bargaining to be an
"essential component of the administration ofjustice." Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 26061 (1971).
205. 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
206. Id. at 581 n.20 (emphasis added).
207. See Brady, 397 U.S. at 750.
208. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1201(a)(5) (2003).
209. Jackson, 390 U.S. at 581-82.
210. Id. at 583 (emphasis in original).
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abridged nor should the attempt to exercise this right impose upon the

defendant an additional penalty or enlargement of
2 11his sentence. The
statement of the trial judge.., we cannot condone.
One reason why appellate court language such as this is unusual is that it
is rare for a trial judge to state so clearly on the record the relationship
between the sentence that is imposed after trial and the refusal of the
defendant to have accepted the offered plea.
There's one additional, and very significant way that judiciallycoerced plea bargaining may often violate the constitutional rights of the
defendant. There is a Fifth Amendment right for an individual not to
incriminate himself,2 1 2 yet if the defendant chooses to exercise that right
by remaining silent, i.e., not to plead guilty, he may well be punished by
an increased sentence after trial.213 It can be demanded that an individual
testify in ways which might, in fact, incriminate himself only when he is
to be granted immunity from penalty or prosecution based on those
statements. It is only after the state makes it clear to the individual that
immunity is to be granted that the state can penalize the individual for
remaining silent. In the plea bargaining scenario, the defendant not only
receives no immunity but is convicted of the crime immediately upon
acknowledging his guilt.
A coerced plea is certainly one form of coerced confession. The
Supreme Court in Brown v. Mississippi214 held that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited states from using
coerced confessions against an individual. And the Court in Malloy v.
Hogan21 5 declared that the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination is the essential mainstay of the American system of
criminal prosecution and that the Fourteenth Amendment protects the
privilege from any form of "abridgment by the States."
How can a defendant's silence (as indicated by a refusal to plead
guilty) be both protected and subject to penalty by the court's increase in
211. State v. Boone, 239 S.E. 2d 459, 465 (N.C. 1977).
212. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
213. See, e.g., State v. Pennington, 712 A.2d 1133 (N.J. 1998); see also supra notes 35-42 and
accompanying text.
214. 297 U.S. 278, 286 (1936).
215. 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964). Some judges seem so antagonistic to a defendant exercising his right
to remain silent that the defendant will actually be asked by the judge to explain why he was
pleading not guilty. See, e.g., McKevitt (N.Y. Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, June 27, 1998),
available at http://www.scjc.state.ny.us/Determinations/M/mckevitt2.htm. The New York State
Commission on Judicial Conduct concluded that such questioning by the judge gives the defendant
the appearance that the judge wants him to plead guilty. Id.
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punishment because that silence necessitated a jury trial? The
constitutional right of an individual charged with crime to force the
government to prove its case without the aid of the defendant has existed
in this country "since the earliest days of the Republic. '21 6 The burden
upon the state to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt is
not a mere formality but is a crucial and vital component of our system
of criminal justice.217 The individual accused of crime has every
right-and the exercise of rights must be protected not penalized-to
seek to have the prosecution meet its burden.
Even in situations where the judge himself is not an active
participant in determining the plea deal offered to the defendant, the
judge has the ethical responsibility of ensuring that the prosecutor is
acting appropriately. A prosecutor, unlike virtually any other attorney,
has an ethical obligation that extends beyond just representing his
"client"; the prosecutor has the duty to seek justice and "to guard the
2 18
rights of the accused as well as to enforce the rights of the public.,
The prosecutor is to be "an administrator
of justice, 219 whose duty is "to
220
convict.,
to
seek justice, not merely
The obligation of the judge to protect the defendant from
prosecutorial misconduct 22' flows not just from the judicial obligation to
216. Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 233 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also 8
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2251 (McNaughten rev. ed. 1961), quoted in Corbitt, 439 U.S. at 229
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (explaining that the Fifth Amendment privilege enables an individual to
"requir[e] the government in its contest with the individual to shoulder the entire load").
217. Corbitt,439 U.S. at 228 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing State v. Hardy, 128 S.E. 152,
155 (N.C. 1925)).
218.

PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION, supra note 25, Standard 3-1.2 cmt.;

see also United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110-11 (1976), modified by United States v. Bagley,
473 U.S. 667, 681 (1985) (requiring prosecutors to prosecute with vigor but also to be faithful to the
overriding concern that "justice... be done"); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, supra note 165
at R. 3.8 cmt. (charging prosecutors with the responsibility of being "a minister of justice and not
simply that of an advocate"); PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 165, at EC 7-13. One primary
obligation is the duty of the prosecutor to provide the defense with any exculpatory evidence
obtained by the prosecutor. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 (2002).
219. PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION, supra note 25, Standard 3-1.2(b). A
witness that a prosecutor might potentially call at trial to testify against the defendant does not
"belong" to the prosecutor and it is improper for the prosecutor to suggest to a witness that the
witness not agree to be interviewed pre-trial by defense counsel. See id. at Standard 3-3.1 cmt.
220. Id. at Standard 3-1.2(c). The dual responsibilities of the prosecutor exist not just at trial,
but at all stages of the prosecution. See id. at Standard 3-2.8. The prosecutor has the burden of
disclosing to the court the existence of any legal authority known to the prosecutor which is adverse
to the position of the prosecutor. See id. at Standard 3-2.8(d).
221. There's a danger that some judges may view their own role as that of the judicial arm of
the prosecutor's office and too often defer to the perceived need for both to act together to deter
crime. Such a perspective may lead to the view that the defense counsel is an obstacle to the goals
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ensure that the due process rights of defendants are protected, but also
from the judge's responsibility to be "mindful of the attorneys' duties"
in any case before the court.222 The prosecutor is clearly deemed to be
"4an officer of the court" 223 and the court cannot in any way sanction
prosecutorial abuse of what is often very far-reaching discretion. 4 The
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice note the possibility that "personal
ideological, or political beliefs" of prosecutors 225 might improperly
influence a prosecutor's conduct as might the "desire for personal
achievement, or for personal or political success. 2 2 6
Prosecutors' offices increasingly rely upon statistics to gauge the
success of the office as well as the individual assistant district attorneys,
and the focus is on conviction rate. A guilty plea is a conviction, and the
judge must be alert to situations where the prosecutor's case is too weak
to survive a challenge at trial so the prosecutor is all the more
determined to get a plea of guilty pre-trial. In such circumstances, the
prosecutor may well attempt to have his case seem to be far stronger
than it in fact is. The judge cannot be a party to pressuring a defendant to
plead guilty to a charge that the prosecutor is simply not able to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt. This would include situations where the
prosecutor's case is dependant upon illegally-obtained evidence which
would not be admissible at trial.
Vigilance may well be required on the part of the judge to ensure
that the prosecutor does not act to violate the defendant's rights. The
prosecutor is instructed by the ABA Criminal Justice Standards not to
"seek a continuance solely for the purpose of mooting the preliminary
hearing by securing an indictment ' 227 and the judge therefore must be an
of law enforcement. One judge certainly expressed this view: "[1]f crime is, in fact, on the increase
today, it is due in large part to the fact that waiting in the wings are lawyers who are willing to
forego their professional responsibilities, professional obligations, professional duty in their defense
[of their client]." Schwartz, supra note 50, at 135 n.13 (quoting Judge Julius Hoffman who directed
his remarks to attorney William Kuntsler after sentencing Kuntsler for contempt of court in United
States v. Dellinger,657 F.2d 140 (7th Cir. 1981)).

222. SPECIAL FUNCTIONS, supra note 156, at Standard 6-1.1(c) cmt. The Standard is not meant
to apply just to defense counsel, but clearly requires judges to be cognizant of the propriety of the
prosecutor's conduct as well. See also United States v. Rogers, 471 F. Supp. 847, 852 (E.D.N.Y.
1979) (mem.) (recognizing that the court has inherent power to require compliance with
fundamental ethical and professional standards).
223.

PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION, supra note 25, at Standard 3-1.2(b).

224. Id. (requiring the prosecutor to "exercise sound discretion in the performance of his or her
functions").
225. Id.at Standard 3-1.3 cmt.
226. Id.

227. Id. at Standard 3-3.10(d).
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active enquirer of the prosecutor. The prosecutor is not to seek
"excessive bail ... in an attempt to coerce a plea agreement. ''221 Yet not
only do judges fail to prevent such bail requests, judges may frequently
be the very ones who are using high bail to obtain a plea. In fact, judges
may do what the judge in People v. DerrickSmith229 did: entirely revoke
the bail that had been set by a different judge as part of the attempt to
230

persuade the defendant to plead guilty.

Judges may, especially in misdemeanor cases, set bail at a level
they expect is too great for the defendant to make, and then indicate to
the defendant that were he to plead guilty the sentence would be time
served and he'd be released from custody. For example, the Referee's
findings in The Matter of Judge Henry Bauer, concerning a judge who
was being investigated by the New York State Commission on Judicial
Conduct, concluded that the judge had coerced pleas in that "defendants
had no alternative but to plead guilty and receive [the judge's] sentence
so that they could be discharged from jail."23 ' In another matter as well,
a Criminal Court Judge in New York City232 was also disciplined in part
because she had conveyed "the explicit message that she was using bail
as a coercive tactic when defendants appeared reluctant to accept the
233
plea that was offered.,
It is rare that judges are disciplined, and it's even more uncommon
when the discipline is based on judicial violation of the due process
rights of defendants. Yet such discipline ofjudges is vital because, as the
Supreme Court of New Jersey indicated when ordering the removal of a
municipal court judge:234 "[A]nything that happens in just a few of the
courtrooms casts a shadow upon all of us.

23 5

At those rare times when a

judge is disciplined for conduct that many judges may in fact be

228. Id. at Standard 3-3.10 cmt.
229. People v. Derrick Smith (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998) (Indictment No. 7996-98).
230. The transcript of Derrick Smith reveals that immediately after the judge stated "Bail
conditions are remand, gentlemen," the court went on to say: "Now, the offer in this case, Mr. Barry,
for today only is three to six which he obviously is not obligated to accept." Official Court
Transcript, supra note 7, at 4 (emphasis added).
231. Bauer (N.Y. Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, Mar. 30, 2004), available at
http://www.scjc.state.ny.us/Determinations/B/bauer.htm.
232. See Recant (N.Y. Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, Nov. 19, 2001), available at
http://www.scjc.state.ny.us/Determinations/R/Recant.htm.
233. Id.
234. In re Yengo, 371 A.2d 41, 56 (N.J. 1977).
235. Id. at 46 (quoting comments of former Chief Justice Weintraub at the Eleventh Annual
Conference of Magistrates in New Jersey in 1959). In the Yengo matter, the court found that the
disciplined judge had used bail as an "arbitrary weapon for harassment of defendants." Id. at 51.
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engaging in, it is particularly necessary for such rebuke to get
widespread publicity (especially within the legal community) so that
judges may be deterred from engaging in such inappropriate conduct in
the future. When a judge feels that he is not accountable, then the
arrogant abuse of power may flourish.
The ethical obligations of the prosecutor exist at the time of the
commencement of the case against the defendant and most certainly
exist at the arraignment of the defendant where plea bargaining might
36
well be occurring. The ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduce
mandate the prosecutor to "make timely disclosure to the defense of all
evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the
guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense. 237 The corresponding ABA
Criminal Justice Standard emphasizes that any disclosure must be made
"at the earliest feasible opportunity." 238 The judge should ensure that if,
indeed, there is exculpatory material of which the prosecutor is aware,
that the defendant is so informed before any plea is entered, and that the
judge, before he decides what plea bargain would be appropriate, is also
apprised of such evidence.
For any defendant to intelligently assess the advisability of pleading
guilty, (and it is the defendant who has the "ultimate authority" to
determine whether or not to plead guilty) 239 it is absolutely crucial that
he be able to assess the strength of the case against him. 240 For counsel
to advise his client appropriately, the counsel must be aware of problems

236. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, supranote 165. The House of Delegates of the ABA
adopted the Model Rules of Professional Conduct in August of 1983 after years of study and draftrecommendations by the ABA Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards. See id. The
ABA expected and intended the Model Rules of Professional Responsibility to replace the Model
Code of Professional Responsibility. See id. The Model Code of Professional Responsibility was
designed both as an inspirational guide to attorneys as well as a basis for disciplinary action and
consisted of three separate, but interrelated, parts: Canons, Ethical Considerations, and Disciplinary
Rules. See PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 165, at x, 1. The Model Code of Professional
Responsibility replaced the ABA's Canons of Professional Ethics, which was adopted in 1908. See
id. at ix.
237. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, supra note 165, at R. 3.8(d); see also PROF'L
RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 165, at DR 7-103(B); NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS Standard

25.4 (National District Attorneys Ass'n, 1991) (requiring prosecutors to "disclose the existence or
nature of exculpatory evidence pertinent to the defense").
238.

239.
240.
defenses
knowing

PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION, supra note 25, at Standard 3-3.11 (a).

Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983).
See, e.g., PLEAS OF GUILTY, supra note 7, at Standard 14-1.3(b) cmt. (understanding the
available to a defendant to the charges is an important factor in assuming that a plea is
and voluntary).
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of proof and possible defenses.24 1 Yet a prosecutor, in the hurried
atmosphere of America's urban criminal courts, may be disinclined to
impart any information to defense counsel that might inhibit plea
agreement negotiations. 242 Furthermore, the judge, instead of ensuring
the prosecutor's compliance with his ethical 243 and legal244 duties, may
be so desirous of the plea bargain that the judge will instead attempt to
impress upon the defendant the high likelihood of conviction after trial.
Any evidence that may be exculpatory for the defendant may well be
regarded as an obstacle toward obtaining the guilty plea.24 5 Certainly, at
the least, the judge's pressure on all parties to quickly come to a
resolution of the matter does not produce an atmosphere that is
conducive to the defendant becoming aware of the existence of
exculpatory evidence.
On rare occasions, the judge may be confronted with a prosecutor
whom the judge considers to be unreasonably rigid and therefore
preventing an appropriate plea by the defendant to a charge which is less
than the one he currently faces. For this dilemma, the judge has a trump
card.246 He could make it clear to both sides that if the defendant were to
241. See, e.g., id at Standard 14-3.2 cmt. (requiring counsel's assistance to help the defendant
assess the likelihood of conviction).
242. Cf PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION, supra note 25, at Standard 3-3.11
cmt. A proper and ethical judge would not accept any guilty plea without confirming that the
defendant's counsel had been effective. The judge, therefore, should inquire about the extent of
investigation done, the degree of communication between counsel and the defendant, and the
sufficiency of discovery material supplied by the prosecutor.
243. See id. at Standard 3-3.11(c). It is, in fact, unprofessional for a prosecutor to remain
intentionally ignorant of, or to improperly refrain from investigating, leads that may weaken the
prosecutor's case. See id.
244. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that the defendant's due process
rights are violated when the prosecutor suppresses evidence favorable to the accused, and that the
defendant's constitutional rights are violated "irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the
prosecution").
245. See, e.g., Sanchez v. United States, 50 F.3d 1448, 1453 (9th Cir. 1995); White v. United
States 858 F.2d 416, 422-23 (8th Cir. 1988).
246. See, e.g., 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/103-6 (West 1992); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 780 (West 1998); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 218, § 26A (West 1993). This approach
would not work in the federal courts nor in more than half of the states where a prosecutor's consent
is required in order for the defendant to waive a jury. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-1-2 (West
1998); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 763.3(1) (West 2000); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 1.13
(Vernon 1977 & Supp. 2004). Since the imposition of the United States Sentencing Guidelines
governing the federal courts, there have been many unsettling and, perhaps unexpected,
ramifications.
[Since] certain material "facts," so called, now mathematically drive every sentencing
decision, fact bargaining is today central to plea negotiation in federal court. Everyone
involved knows it. Prosecutors and defense counsel are knowingly involved in this fraud
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waive his right to a jury trial and proceed with a bench trial, the judge
would not convict the defendant of the highest count. In some felony
trial courts, the prosecutor may agree for a variety of reasons with the
judge that the best way to proceed is with the trial.247 The prosecutor, for
example, due to his office's "no reduced-plea" policy, may be prohibited
from agreeing to a reduced charge in exchange for a guilty plea by the
defendant. 248 Yet the prosecutor does not wish a jury trial on the highest
count and understands that in exchange for the defendant's jury waiver,
the judge will find the defendant guilty for an offense less serious than
the highest charge.24 9 Since all parties understand what the outcome of
the "trial" will be, some refer to these curtailed trials as "long pleas. 250
Judges must be guardians of the constitutional rights of those
defendants who appear before them.2 5' Our system of federalism not
only requires that state courts protect the rights afforded by the
Constitution, 252 but the state courts are to be "the primary guarantors of
constitutional rights. 253 Virtually every state in the country requires that
a judge upon taking office take an oath to "support, protect and defend"

and courts-now largely stripped of the powers to make fully informed sentencing
decisions-tacitly acquiesce when satisfied with the negotiated plea. As a result,
sentencing under the Sentencing Guidelines today is, as one of my colleagues so aptly
puts it, "a massive exercise in hypocrisy."
Berthoff v. United States, 140 F. Supp. 2d 50, 62-64 (D. Mass. 2001) (footnotes omitted). Fact
bargaining exists even though it is not appropriate for the parties to engage in it. U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6B1.4 cmt. (2003) ("It is not appropriate for the parties to stipulate to
misleading or non-existent facts, even when both parties are willing to assume the existence of such
'facts' for purposes of the litigation.").
247. See Court, supra note 2, at 56.
248. Id.
249. See id
250. Id.
251. In fact, even prosecutors have some obligations in this regard. See PROSECUTION
FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION, supra note 25, at Standard 3-3.1 cmt. (stating that prosecutors
"must take the lead in assuring that investigations of criminal activities are conducted lawfully and
in full and ungrudging accordance with the safeguards of the Bill of Rights"). When it comes to the
adversarial in-court relationship with an overburdened defense counsel, the prosecutor is more
likely to exploit defense counsel's ineffectiveness than focus on the defendant's Sixth Amendment
right to effective assistance of counsel. See Bruce A. Green, Practice Context: Criminal Neglect:
Indigent Defense From a Legal Ethics Perspective, 52 EMORY L.J. 1169, 1171 (2003). See
generally Vanessa Merton, What Do You Do When You Meet a "Walking Violation of the Sixth
Amendment" If You're Trying to Put That Lawyer's Client in Jail? 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 997
(2000).
252. See, e.g., Batchelor v. Cupp, 693 F.2d 859, 862 (9th Cir. 1982).
253. Id. (quoting PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 359 (2d ed. 1973)).
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the Constitution of the United States.254 Some states, such as Tennessee,
go further and require that the judge "solemnly swear ' '255 to "administer
justice without respect to persons, and do equal rights to the poor and the
rich., 256 All too often, counsel for the indigent do not provide the
defendant with the constitutionally-mandated assistance of counsel.2 57 A
2002 report, funded in part by the American Bar Association's Standing
Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defense concluded that the
promise of Gideon258 was far from realized and that "public defense too
often means a lawyer who is overwhelmed, unqualified, or politically
compromised., 259 If a United States Attorney General was aware of the
severity of the problem, 260 and if state prosecutors are aware of the

254. See, e.g., MONT. CONST. art. III, § 3 (2001), reprinted in THE MONTANA STATE
CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE (2001); see also, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. XX § 3 (West 1996)
(requiring judges to pledge to "support and defend" the Constitution); HAW. CONST. art. XVI, § 4
(1993) (requiring judges to swear to "support and defend" the Constitution).
255. TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-2-120 (1994). Some states require the judges to use the word
"swear," others permit a judge merely to "affirm." E.g., CAL. CONST. art. XX § 3 (West 1996)
(requiring the judge either to swear or to affirm); HAW. CONST. art. XVI, § 4 (1993) (requiring the
judge either to swear or to affirm); MONT. CONST. art. III, § 3 (2001), reprinted in THE MONTANA
STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE (2001) (requiring the judge either to swear or to
affirm); see also, e.g., MASS. CONST. amend, art. VI (2003). In Massachusetts, if the judge be of the
"denomination called Quakers," the judge can omit the words "So help me God," and substitute:
"This I do under the pains and penalties of perjury." Id.
256. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-3-1 (1997); TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-2-120 (1994).
257. See Green, supra note 251, at 1169-70 (referring to the "systemic neglect of indigent
defendants" by counsel whose practice violate professional norms). The problems of insufficient
resources and overburdened defense counsel have, for a long time, plagued the criminal justice
system, but in recent years, when the recession has led to severe economic problems for local and
state governments, representation of indigent defendants has been especially hard hit. See
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS, Low-BID CRIMINAL DEFENSE
CONTRACTING: JUSTICE IN RETREAT 1, 6 (1997) (concluding that "criminal defense for the poor...
has deteriorated markedly in recent years"); Memorandum From Michael N. Gambrill, District
Public Defender, Baltimore, Md. to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City (June 22, 1998) (informing
the circuit court that due to a 20.8% increase in cases at the Circuit Court level between 1997 and
1998 "the attorneys' ability to provide adequate representation is seriously challenged").
258. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
259. TASK FORCE ON IMPROVING PUBLIC DEFENSE SERVICES INMICHIGAN, MODEL PLAN FOR
PUBLIC DEFENSE SERVICES IN MICHIGAN 3 (2002); see also ALLAN K. BUTCHER & MICHAEL K.
MOORE, COMM. ON LEGAL SERVICES TO THE POOR IN CRIMINAL MATTERS, MUTING GIDEON'S
TRUMPET: THE CRISIS IN INDIGENT CRIMINAL DEFENSE IN TEXAS 18, 22 (2000) (reporting that the

system of criminal defense representation for the indigent is in a state of crisis largely because of
inadequate funding).
260. See U.S. Attorney General Reno Demonstrates Her Commitment to Indigent Defense
Issues, SPANGENBERG REP. (The Spangenberg Group, West Newton, Mass.), Nov. 1997, at 14
(detailing Attorney General Reno's work with other members of the Justice Department relating to
the funding of indigent defense).
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problem,26 1 then certainly trial judges are as well.262 And in the
legislative fiscal years 2003 and 2004, the recession and the budget crisis
confronting local and state governments led to nationwide reductions in
expenditures for indigent defense.263
It is certainly the case that one way that reduced staffs, with
reduced funding and more cases per attorney than in the past, try to
minimize their caseloads is to have their clients enter guilty pleas. 2 4
[T]he promise of Gideon is not completely fulfilled. Indigent defendants do not
invariably receive effective assistance of counsel .... Sometimes it is caused by a lack of
resources. ... such failings inevitably erode the community's sense of justice and the
aspiration of our system to equal justice under the law.
Janet Reno, Legal Service for Poor Needs Renewed Vigilance, U.S.A. TODAY, Mar. 18, 1998, at
13A.
261. See State Bar Completes Survey on the Status of Indigent Defense in Texas: The
Prosecutors' Perspective, SPANGENBERG REP. (The Spangenberg Group, West Newton, Mass.),
June 1998, at 10. The State Bar of Texas conducted a study focusing on how district attorneys
throughout the state perceived the quality of indigent defense representation. See id.Ninety percent
of the prosecutors believed that counsel for the indigent spent less time on their clients' cases than
did retained counsel and sixty-five percent of the district attorneys felt that indigent defendants
received a less vigorous defense. See id.
262. A 2002 report on indigent defense in America prepared for the ABA concluded that the
prime cause for the failure of states to adequately fund defense services was the declining
percentage of lawyers in state legislatures. ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AID AND
INDIGENT DEFENDANTS ET AL., REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES: TEN PRINCIPLES OF A
PUBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY SYSTEM Intro. (2002) [hereinafter REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF
DELEGATES]. The report concluded that lawyers would have a better understanding than lay people
of the need to provide quality legal representation for criminal defendants. See id.
263. See Fiscal Year 2004 Legislative Scorecard: Developments Affecting Indigent Defense,
SPANGENBERG REP. (The Spangenberg Group, West Newton, Mass.), Nov. 2003, at 1. Budget cuts
caused states such as Tennessee to layoff public defenders. See id. at 5. The failure of Massachusetts
to pay money owed to court-appointed counsel for the indigent led to those attorneys rejecting new
cases. See id. at 13. Diminishing resources for defense services was, in part, responsible for the
adoption in 2002 by the ABA House of Delegates of Ten Principles of a Public Defense Delivery
System. The Report calls for "parity" between defense counsel and the district attorneys' offices
with respect to workload, salaries and other resources such as benefits, support staff, paralegals,
investigators. REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, supranote 262, at Principle 8; see also ABA
JUVENILE JUSTICE CENTER & MID-ATLANTIC JUVENILE DEFENDER CENTER, MARYLAND: AN
ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY
PROCEEDINGS 31 (Elizabeth Cumming et al. eds., 2003) [hereinafter MARYLAND: AN ASSESSMENT]

(indicating that defender offices lack investigators and social workers, unlike the states attorney's
office which utilizes the police to assist in investigations); Rita Fry, Gideon at Forty: The Promise
Comes With a Price Tag, CORNERSTONE (Nat'l Legal Aid & Defender Ass'n), Winter 2002-2003,
at 2, 24 (calling on Public Defenders to actively seek increased funding from legislative bodies).
264. An investigative team working on behalf of the ABA Standing Committee on Legal Aid
and Indigent Defendants analyzed the operations of the San Francisco Public Defender Office.
NORMAN LEFSTE1N, ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS,
CRIMINAL DEFENSE SERVICES FOR THE POOR: METHODS AND PROGRAMS FOR PROVIDING LEGAL

REPRESENTATION AND THE NEED FOR ADEQUATE FINANCING 31-39 (1982). The Report of the
Committee concluded that the public defenders indeed did have excessive caseloads and "Public
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Lawyers in public defender offices simply lack sufficient resources to
prepare each and every case for trial,265 so the selection process causes
counsel in many instances to push a plea because the lawyer simply is
unprepared for trial on that case. 266 One would hope that most defense
counsel don't go quite as far as those in Detroit, who were reported to be
"'pounding the crap out of their clients' in order to get them to plead
26 7

guilty.

The lawyer who has not prepared the matter for trial has probably
also violated his obligations to his client regarding possible plea
recommendations because, as the Supreme Court held in Von Moltke v.
Defender attorneys acknowledged that sometimes, due to lack of time, cases that probably should
be tried terminate with the client pleading guilty on the advice of counsel." ld. at 35 (emphasis
added). A Connecticut study concluded that the tremendous caseloads of the public defenders
precluded the counsel from being able to devote the time required on each case and led most
defendants to plead guilty. See JONATHAN D. CASPER, AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE
DEFENDANT'S PERSPECTIVE 103, 108 (1972). Due to their excessive caseloads, court-appointed
counsel as well as public defenders encourage clients to plead guilty. See, e.g., ABA JUVENILE
JUSTICE CENTER ET AL., THE CHILDREN LEFT BEHIND: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL
AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS IN LOUISIANA 58 (Gabriella
Celeste & Patricia Puritz eds., 2001) (defenders' grueling caseloads seriously compromise the
quality of representation); LAVAL S. MILLER-WILSON & PATRICIA PURITZ, ABA JUVENILE JUSTICE
CENTER ET AL., PENNSYLVANIA: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF
REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 3, 31 (2003) (excessive caseloads of defenders
prevented meaningful contact with their clients); TEXAS APPLESEED FAIR DEFENSE PROJECT ON
INDIGENT DEFENSE PRACTICES IN TEXAS, SELLING JUSTICE SHORT: JUVENILE INDIGENT DEFENSE
IN TEXAS 22 (2000) [hereinafter SELLING JUSTICE SHORT].
265. A study of 399 defender offices revealed that the rate of guilty pleas increased as the
caseloads of the attorneys increased. See NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N. INDIGENT
DEFENSE SYSTEMS ANALYSIS (1978); see also LEFSTEIN, supra note 264, at app. at F-1.
266. See, e.g., Glen Wilkerson, Public Defenders as Their Clients See Them, I AM. J. CRIM. L.
141, 143-44 (1972) (concluding, after a study conducted in Denver, that pressure by lawyers to
plead guilty was a common complaint of defendants that led to their lack of confidence in their
counsel); Note, Comparison of Public Defenders' and Private Attorneys' Relationships with the
Prosecution in the City of Denver, 50 DENVER L.J. 101, 123 (1973) (describing the situation at the
Denver Public Defender Office as follows: "[t]he overflowing dockets make it necessary that most
of [the defenders'] cases be disposed of as quickly as possible").
267. Court, supra note 2, at 56. The failure of this country to provide adequate resources for
counsel for the indigent has led academics, bar association committees, and criminal defense
attorneys to try to outdo one another for titles of articles or reports that convey the failure of Gideon
v. Wainright to lead to the' type of representation for indigent defendants that was expected. See,
e.g., Douglas L. Colbert, Thirty Five Years After Gideon: The Illusory Right to Counsel at Bail
Proceedings, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 2-7 (1998); Steven Keeva, Gideon's Unmet Ideal: Panel
Charges Resources Are Lackingfor Indigent Defense, 77 A.B.A. J. 40 (1991); Richard Klein, The
Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes: The Empty Promise of the Constitutional Right to Effective
Assistance of Counsel, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 625 (1986); Victoria Nourse, Gideon-A
Generation Later: Gideon's Muted Trumpet, 58 MD. L. REV. 1417, 1419 (1999); Note, Gideon's
Promise Unfulfilled: The Need for Litigated Reform of Indigent Defense, 113 HARV. L. REV. 2062,
2062-63 (2000).
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Gillies, "an accused is entitled to rely upon his counsel to make an
independent examination of the facts, circumstances, pleadings and laws
involved and then to offer his informed opinion as to what plea should
be entered., 268 Although it may well be that the obligations of the
attorney to a client who pleads guilty is less than that due a client whose
case will go to trial, counsel must still "provide his client with an
understanding of the law in relation to the facts, so that the accused may
make an informed and conscious choice between accepting the
prosecution's offer and going to trial. 26 9 Whereas it is clear that a plea
which is entered because counsel is unprepared for trial would be
considered involuntary, it is most difficult for the defendant to prove, on
appeal, that he entered the guilty plea strictly because he feared going to
trial with counsel who was not prepared for trial.27 °
Judges, by failing in their roles as watchdogs over the
constitutionality of the court proceedings, become parties to the travesty
of justice.271 Consider, for example, the trial judge in a death penalty
case who just stood by while the defendant's attorney, according to court
observers, "seems to have slept his way through virtually the entire
trial. 272 The Houston newspaper which was covering the trial described
the defense attorney: "His mouth kept falling open and his head lolled
back on his shoulders, and then he awakened just long enough to catch

268. Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 721 (1948) (emphasis added). Even though counsel
has the duty to advise a client as to the desirability of a proposed plea bargain, the client must make
the ultimate decision. See PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 163, at EC 7-7.
269. Wofford v. Wainwright, 748 F.2d 1505, 1508 (11 th Cir. 1984) (per curiam).
270. See supra notes 257-67 and accompanying text. The reductions in funds available for
defense of the indigent impacts most of the individuals prosecuted in our criminal courts. In the year
2000, eighty-two percent of felony defendants in large state courts had either public defenders or
court-appointed counsel as their attorneys. See HARLOW, supra note 79, at I.
271. One reason perhaps why judges are unsympathetic to claims by counsel for the indigent
that they have too many cases to be able to provide the constitutionally-mandated level of
competent representation is that the judges themselves may feel that they are the ones who are truly
overburdened. See, e.g., Dade County v. Baker, 362 So. 2d 151, 153-54 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978)
(quashing a trial court's order granting the public defender's motion to withdraw due to his and the
public defenders office's excessive caseload), rev'd sub noma., Escambia County v. Behr, 384 So. 2d
147 (Fla. 1980). An appellate court, in ruling that the defender need not be permitted to withdraw,
frankly commented that "[w]e are influenced in this decision by the fact that there are many offices
of the judicialbranch which consider themselves overworked." Baker, 362 So. 2d, at 154 (emphasis
added). The exact connection between a decision to permit individuals to be denied effective
assistance of counsel and the judicial branch being overloaded was not spelled out.
272. John Makeig, Asleep on the Job?, HOUSTON CHRON., Aug. 14, 1992, at A35. When a
journalist asked the lawyer why he had fallen asleep repeatedly, the counsel explained: "It's
boring." Id. The lawyer added that he customarily takes "a short nap in the afternoon." Bruce
Shapiro, Sleeping Lawyer Syndrome, NATION, Apr. 7, 1997, at 27.
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himself and sit upright. Then it happened again. And again. And again.
Every time he opened his eyes a different prosecution witness was on the
stand ....,,273 This judge was explicit in his understanding of the

constitutional rights of those on trial before him: "'The Constitution
doesn't say the lawyer has to be awake.' ' 274 Not only did the judge fail
to preserve the due process rights of the defendant, but two days after the
verdict was returned in this three-day long trial, the judge sentenced the
defendant to death.275 Lest one think that this was an anomaly, judges in
at least three death penalty cases in Texas have presided over trials in
which the defendant's counsel slept during significant portions of their
trials.276 Judges clearly have the duty to prevent miscarriages of justice
that are occurring before their very eyes.
And it's certainly not just Texas,27 7 although a report prepared for
the State Bar of Texas concluded that, "[s]imply put the state of Texas is
a national embarrassment in the area of indigent legal services., 278 In the
California case of People v. Garrison,279 defense counsel not only
"consumed large amounts of alcohol each day of the trial, 280 but on the
second day of the jury selection process was arrested for driving to court
with a .27 blood-alcohol reading, well over the legal limit. 281 What was

the response of the trial judge to the defendant's concern about having
been appointed a counsel who was too intoxicated to provide competent

273. Makeig, supra note 272.
274. Id. (quoting District Judge Doug Shaver).
275. See Shapiro, supra note 272.
276. See id Texas appellate courts offer little remedy for the failures of the trial courts. In fact,
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeal has, at times, been more anxious than prosecutors to let death
penalty sentences stand. See, e.g., Ex parte Smith, 977 S.W.2d 610 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998)
(denying an extension to the defendant's counsel to file an appellate brief, despite the district
attorney's recommendation to the court to grant the extension); Editorial, A Disgraceful Vote,
AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, Apr. 27, 1998, at Al. One of the dissenting judges stated that the
court's decision 'borders on barbarism."' Ex Parte Smith, 977 S.W.2d at 614 (Overstreet, J.,
dissenting).
277. See, e.g., People v. Tippins, 570 N.Y.S.2d 581, 582-83 (App. Div. 1991) (rejecting
defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim where defense counsel also slept during the
trial).
278. BUTCHER & MOORE, supra note 259, at 22.
279. 765 P.2d 419 (Cal. 1989).
280. Id. at 440. The bailiff testified on an appeal of the conviction that the lawyer "always
smelled of alcohol," and it was reported that the counsel "drank in the morning, during court
recesses, and throughout the evening." Id.
281. See id.See generally Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Drink, Drugs, and Drowsiness: The
ConstitutionalRight to Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Strickland PrejudiceRequirement,
75 NEB. L. REv. 425 (1996) (likening sleeping counsel cases to Strickland-based claims where
defendants' counsel were under the influence of alcohol or drugs).
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representation? The trial judge reassured the defendant that "I personally
can assure you that you probably have one of the finest defense counsel
in this country. 28 2 The defendant upon conviction was sentenced
to
284
death; 283 his counsel died as a result of his chronic alcoholism.
In another sleeping counsel case, Javor v. United States,2 85 one is
again left wondering just how a judge could have permitted the criminal
trial to proceed, given the clear Sixth Amendment violation that was
occurring in open court. At a habeas corpus petition hearing, the federal
magistrate found that
[P]etitioner's trial counsel was asleep or dozing, and not alert to
proceedings, during a substantial part of the trial of petitioner and his
two co-defendants; that by reason thereof petitioner was not assisted
by counsel at a substantial portion of the trial, including some
occasions when evidence relevant to the prosecution case against
defendant and very likely to his defense was being elicited and the
participation of trial counsel (to observe witnesses, listen to testimony,
consider the posing of objections, prepare cross-examination of
witnesses, consider the preparation of rebuttal
evidence, and prepare
286
argument on such evidence) was proper.
Judges may, in fact, be at times directly responsible for the
defendant being represented by ineffective counsel. In another death
penalty case, this time in Louisiana,287 the judge appointed as counsel a
lawyer who had recently been convicted of a felony and sentenced to a
three year suspended sentence and 416 hours of community service.288
The judge insisted, over the objections of the lawyer, that the lawyer
282. Garrison, 765 P.2d at 440 (internal quotation marks omitted). An expert witness who
testified on appeal, however, concluded that a chronic alcoholic such as this counsel is unable to
make proper judgment calls or to think through problems. See id. at 441.
283. See id. at 422. The appellate court did ultimately set aside some parts of the judgment and
reversed the death sentence. See id. at 446.
284. See id. at 440.
285. 724 F.2d 831 (9th Cir. 1984).
286. Id. at 832 (quoting the magistrate's findings from an evidentiary hearing). The Ninth
Circuit found that the defendant's right to effective assistance was violated by the counsel's
sleeping during a "substantial portion of the trial." Id. at 833-34. The court did not indicate whether
its concern was the amount of time counsel had been sleeping or that what had occurred at trial
while counsel slept was "substantial" (i.e., highly significant). The same court, just one year later,
declined to find ineffective assistance because it had not been shown that that counsel had actually
slept during a "substantial" portion of the trial. United States v. Peterson, 777 F.2d 482, 484 (9th
Cir. 1985) (per curiam).
287. State v. Wille, 595 So. 2d 1149 (La. 1992).
288. See id. at 1151. The conviction of the defendant was for conspiracy to defraud an agency
of the United States. See id.
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fulfill his community service by representing the defendant in this
capital case.289 Counsel had no experience or training in the
representation of individuals in death penalty cases and had been a
former state senator whose indictment and sentencing had received
"substantial media coverage" in the local area of Louisiana where the
trial occurred. 290 The judge not only never informed the defendant of his
counsel's notoriety, but never even questioned the jurors about their
knowledge of the counsel's felony conviction. 29 ' Counsel inthis case
had clearly communicated to the judge that he did not wish to be
appointed to represent this defendant, but his wishes were ignored.292
Even where a counsel in a Georgia court 29 3 had stated publicly "I despise
[this appointment], I'd rather take a whipping," the court was so
unconcerned about the quality of lawyering that would be provided the
defendant that the judge, nevertheless, refused to relieve that attorney of
the court-assigned representation. 294
The need for judges to ensure that defendants who are ready to
plead guilty have not had their due process rights violated is made all the
stronger because of the defendant's overall inability to appeal.295 The
rationale for the loss of the right to appeal is that, "[b]y definition, a
defendant who pleads guilty relinquishes his defense. 296 The Supreme
Court in Tollett v. Henderson297 held that once a defendant pleads guilty
he cannot subsequently raise claims alleging that he was deprived of
constitutional or procedural rights that occurred prior to his guilty
plea.298 The record of the court proceedings typically reflects little more

289. Seeid ati152.
290. Id.at 1151.
291. See id.It certainly is within the realm of possibility that a juror who was aware of the
felony conviction of defendant's lawyer would not have believed that counsel's arguments were
credible, as normally would be the case. The counsel explained that he didn't raise the issue of
whether jurors were familiar with his legal difficulties on voir dire because he was too embarrassed.
Seeid. at 1152.
292. See id.at 1152.
293. Coleman v. Kemp, 778 F.2d 1487 (11 th Cir. 1985).
294. Id. at 1522 (internal quotation marks omitted).
295. See Frank v. Blackburn, 646 F.2d 873, 882 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc), modified on other
grounds, 646 F.2d 902 (5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (indicating that the only grounds whereby a
federal court will set aside a guilty plea entered in state court is if the defendant was denied his right
to due process). Most of these claims get to federal court in a habeas proceeding and the district
court can, therefore, conduct an evidentiary hearing.
296. Stano v. Dugger, 921 F.2d 1125, 1148 (11 th Cir. 1991).
297. 411 U.S. 258 (1973).
298. See id. at 266.
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than the defendant's waiver of his right to a jury trial, 299 his statement
admitting the factual allegations that support the crime to which he has
pled guilty, 300 that the plea was entered voluntarily, 30 1 and that the
defendant was aware of
the elements of the crime to which he has
30 2
guilty.
of
plea
a
offered
Quality of lawyering is certainly not on the minds of those judges
who punish a defendant when counsel for the defendant files a motion
claiming, for instance, that the defendant's Fourth or Fifth Amendment
303
rights had been violated by the police. For example, in Goss v. State,
the Mississippi trial court judge had told the defendant, who was charged
with burglary, and his counsel that if any pretrial motions were presented
to the court then the defendant would not be permitted to enter into any
plea bargain agreement. 304 The judge added that were the defendant to
be convicted at trial, the judge's sentence would be the maximum
possible: life without the possibility of parole. 30 5 This sentence
contrasted radically with the ten-year sentence the defendant would
receive if he were to plead guilty. 30 6 Apparently even motions for
discovery were included-motions that could yield crucial information
for the defendant to use in assessing the strength of the case against him
and therefore the likelihood of conviction at trial.30 7 Such information
could of course be of great import in formulating an informed decision
about whether to plead or risk conviction at trial.
The judge's purpose in threatening retaliation for any motion that
was to be filed is clear: to avoid having to deal with time-consuming
299. See, e.g., Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243(1969), superseded by FED. R. CRIM. P.
1 (h) (West 1986 & Supp. 2004).
300. See PLEAS OF GUILTY, supra note 7, at Standard 14-1.6 cmt. (requiring the court to assure
itself that, even if the defendant clearly wishes to plead guilty, there exists sufficient evidence to
convict the defendant had he chosen to go to trial). The Commentary warns that "[u]nless the court
inquires into the factual basis for the plea, there is a risk of innocent persons being adjudicated
guilty." Id. But see North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37-38 (1970) (holding that the plea was
properly accepted even though the defendant had refused to admit to the facts of the crime with
which he was charged).
301. See Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242-43 (acknowledging that due process is violated if a plea of
guilty was entered involuntarily).
302. See, e.g., Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 646-47 (1976).
303. 730 So. 2d 568 (Miss. 1998).
304. See id. at 571-72.
305. See id. at 570.
306. See id.
307. One comprehensive research study analyzing "judicial expectations" of defense counsel,
concluded that lawyers who file "too many motions are seen as 'overly aggressive' or 'overly
adversarial' and may well not receive court appointments in the future. SELLING JUSTICE SHORT,
supra note 264, at 16.
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hearings and research. The Supreme Court of Mississippi, in approving
this judge's threat to the defendant, was absolutely clear about the
justification for the judge's policy: "This court notes that this procedure
promotes judicial efficiency in that the court does not spend time hearing
pretrial motions.' 30 8 Certainly, such a statement by the supreme court of
a state can only encourage trial court judges to adopt clear policies to
penalize defendants whose counsel may choose to "waste" the30court's
9
time by providing effective, professionally-mandated, assistance.
In the federal courts, judicial participation in the plea bargaining
process is in fact, prohibited. Former Rule 1 I(e)(1) of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure regarding plea negotiations is clear and absolute:
"The court shall not participate in any such discussions."3 10 There is no
doubt that the Rule's "purpose and meaning are that the sentencing
judge should take no part whatever in any discussion or communication
regarding the sentence to be imposed prior to the entry of a plea of guilty
or conviction." 3 1 The District Court judges are prohibited from even
presenting a guideline to the prosecutor and defense counsel as to what
plea arrangement worked out between the two adversaries would be
acceptable by the court.3 12 Rule 1 I(e)(1) "states a standard for federal
courts 31 3 and is not a constitutional rule,314 therefore, Rule 11 is

308. Goss, 730 So. 2d at 572.
309. Two researchers conducted an analysis of what traits indigent criminal defendants deemed
to be most indicative of an "effective" lawyer. Three separate categories of traits were deemed to be
most significant: 1) loyalty to the client and not to the state which appointed them and paid them; 2)
lawyering skills including legal knowledge, experience, research skills and trial preparation; and 3)
client-relations skills, especially keeping the client informed of developments in the case. See
Marcus T. Boccaccini & Stanley L. Brodsky, supra note 19, at 98-100.
310. FED. R. CRIM. P. I I(e)(l) (1987), reprinted in FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE AND RULES
(West 1987). The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were amended, and the admonition to the
court not to participate in plea negotiations is currently codified at Rule I I(c)(l). See FED. R. CRIM.
P. II(c)(1) (West 1986 & Supp. 2004).
311. United States v. Werker, 535 F.2d 198, 201 (2d Cir. 1976).
312. See United States v. Fleming, 239 F.3d 761 (6th Cir. 2001) (recognizing that Rule
I l(e)(l) is violated when a judge attempts to amend a plea agreement reached by both sides);
United States v. Kraus, 137 F.3d 447, 454 (7th Cir. 1998) (concluding that a judge's indication that
any plea agreement found acceptable by the Court would have to include more prison time than did
the proposed agreement constituted a violation of Rule I l(e)(1)); United States v. Miles, 10 F.3d
1135, 1139 (1993).
313. Blackmon v. Wainwright, 608 F.2d 183, 184 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (emphasis
added).
314. See Alvarez v. Straub, No. 00-1738, 21 Fed. Appx. 281, 283 (6th Cir. 2001) (unpublished
opinion); Frank v. Blackburn, 646 F.2d 873, 880 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc), modified on other
grounds, 646 F.2d 902 (5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
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unfortunately not deemed to be controlling or even applicable to state
courts.315
The defendant who pleads guilty gives up his right to claim an
illegal search or that his confession was coerced.3 16 He can challenge
neither the composition of the grand jury that indicted him, 317 nor the
legal or factual sufficiency of the indictment. 1 8 The defendant is also
precluded from claiming that his right to a speedy trial was violated.31 9 A
defendant who enters a guilty plea unaware of what rights he is giving
up, 32 is certainly not acting with the knowledge that due process
requires. 321
Justification for tolerating plea bargaining must rely on the
supposition that a knowledgeable defendant is engaging in a voluntary
choice when rationally contrasting the punishment he would receive
were he to plead guilty with that which he'd be likely to receive were he
to be convicted after trial.322 Standard 14-1.4 of the ABA Standards for
Criminal Justice instructs the court to inform the defendant that by
pleading guilty he is waiving his right to appeal,323 and the basis and

315. Some states, following the federal courts' lead, have barred trial judges from engaging in
plea bargaining. See, e.g., State v. Bukalew, 561 P.2d 289, 292 (Alaska 1977) (holding that judges
in Alaska are "totally barred from engaging in either charge or sentencing bargaining").
316. See Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973) (holding that a defendant who pleads
guilty in open court "may not thereafter raise independent claims [alleging violations of his]
constitutional rights that occurred prior to his plea"). But see People v. Bowman, 782 N.E. 2d 333,
341 (11l.2002) (holding that when a defendant "enters a guilty plea but maintains his innocence of
the crime, as permitted by Alford... the defendant may collaterally attack" in a post conviction
proceeding, the voluntariness of the confession) (citing North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25
(1970)).
317. See Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 799 (1970); Rabinowitz v. United States, 366
F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1966).
318. See Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 764, 772 (1962) (recognizing that an
indictment that fails to inform the defendant of the facts on which the charges are based may be
quashed).
319. Tiemens v. United States, 724 F.2d 928, 929 (11 th Cir. 1984) (per curiam).
320. It may, in fact, often be required to explain to a defendant the principle that evidence
obtained in violation of his constitutional rights cannot be used against him at trial first. The everincreasing complexities of the exclusionary rule may escape the common knowledge even of most
practicing attorneys.
321. For an explanation by the Supreme Court as to what is required for a guilty plea to be
"knowingly" entered, see Tollett, 411 U.S. at 266-67.
322. See Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 618 (1998) (stating that a valid plea of guilty
must be both "'voluntary' and 'intelligent"') (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748
(1970)).
323. See PLEAS OF GUILTY, supra note 7, at Standard 14-1.4(a)(vi) (indicating that the
defendant would still have the right to appeal a motion that has been made and denied as long as the
judge expressly reserved the right for the defendant to appeal the its denial).
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inherent assumption of this requirement is that the defendant knows
what rights he would have ifhe chose not to plead guilty.324 The import
of Standard 14-1.4, entitled, "Defendant to be Advised," which informs
the court what it must advise the defendant of before accepting any plea
of guilty, is highlighted in the Commentary: "This advice is critical to
the operations of the standards as a whole. '325 The judge must personally
and directly address the defendant "to ensure
that the plea is made with
326
appropriate knowledge and understanding.
"Knowledge" certainly mandates more than the defendant just
understanding that the plea offer is "for today only. 3 27 Clearly, a
defendant who is pleading guilty to a particular charge should be aware
of the elements of the offense. The Supreme Court noted in the landmark
case of Powell v. Alabama328 that trial courts ought not to rely on any
expectation that the defendant possesses information about the law that
is relevant to the charges against him:
Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no
skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable,
generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or
bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence.... He lacks both the
skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he
had a perfect one .... [H]e faces the danger of conviction because he
does not know how to establish his innocence. If that be true of men of
intelligence, how much 329
more true is it of the ignorant and illiterate, or
those of feeble intellect.

324. The comprehensive plea colloquy which is provided for in Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, constitutes the minimum standards for the entry of a knowing and voluntary
plea in the federal courts, but Rule 11 's requirements are not binding on state courts. Gaddy v.
Linahan, 780 F.2d 935, 943 n.8 (1 th Cir. 1986). Some states have enacted firm requirements for a
judge to satisfy before accepting any guilty plea. See, e.g., Ohio v. Filchock, 688 N.E. 1063, 1065
(Ohio 1996) (requiring judges to advise the defendant that: 1) the defendant has a right to a trial by
jury, 2) if the defendant were to choose to go to trial, the prosecution would have to prove him
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, 3) the defendant would have the right to cross-examine the
accusers, 4) the defendant has a right not to testify at any trial, and 5) the defendant has a right to
"compulsory process").
325. PLEAS OF GuILTY,supra note 7, at Standard 14-1.4 cmt. (emphasis added).
326. Id. The Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure, the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure P. and the Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure all require the judge to personally
address the defendant in court. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 1 (c) (1986 & supp. 2004); MODEL CODE OF
PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 350.4(1) (1975); UNIF. R. CRtM. P. 444(c)(1) (1987). Too often,
however, the plea colloquy between the judge and defendant is ritualistic and perfunctory.
327. See Official Court Transcript, supra note 3.
328. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
329. Id. at 68-69.
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The Supreme Court did hold in Henderson v. Morgan330 that where
a defendant is unaware that "intent" was an element of the crime to
which he pled guilty, that plea was not one which was knowingly and
voluntarily entered.33 1 Without such crucial knowledge, a defendant
might plead guilty to a crime when although he did do the act that
caused the harm, he had no "mens rea" and is legally not guilty of the
offense.332
However, even though the Supreme Court held in Smith v.
33 3 that an explanation
O'Grady
to the defendant of the nature of the
charge was "the first and most universally recognized requirement of
due process, 334 the Court has not specifically held, unfortunately, that
an explanation by the judge to the defendant of all the elements that
comprise the offense is constitutionally required. Common sense,
however, would seem to require that the trial court be assured that the
defendant does understand all the elements that comprise the offense
because a plea of guilty represents, in essence, an admission to each and
every element of the offense.335 The Supreme Court itself has explained
that "[d]etermining whether an accused is guilty or innocent of the
charges in a complex legal indictment is seldom a simple and easy task
for a layman. 3 36 The ABA's Pleas of Guilty Standards do require that
the judge, before accepting any guilty plea, determine that the defendant
does understand the nature and elements of the offense that he is
pleading guilty to.33 7 A judge whose focus is on getting the pleas as
quickly as possible is not going to partake in any time-consuming
process to ascertain whether, in fact, the individual understands all that
is required.3 38
The purpose of determining whether there is a factual basis for the
plea-whether the plea reflects what actually occurred-is to protect our

330. 426 U.S. 637 (1976).
331. Seeidat646.
332. United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1989) (stating that a defendant who enters
a plea of guilty is admitting more than just that he engaged in the specific acts detailed in the
indictment, "he is admitting guilt of a substantive crime").
333. 312 U.S. 329 (1941).
334. Id.at 334.
335. See McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969), superseded by FED. R. CRIM.
P. 11(h) (West 1986 & Supp. 2004).
336. Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 721 (1948).
337. See PLEAS OF GUILTY, supra note 7, at Standard 14-1.4.
338. The problem may be particularly acute if the defendant has waived counsel; the burdens
upon the judge to ensure the plea is being entered intelligently are all the greater.
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system from having innocent defendants pleading guilty. 339 There's no
requirement, however, that a particular standard, such as "probable
cause" to believe the defendant did commit the crime he is pleading
guilty to, be followed by the court. The recommendation of the
American Law Institute340 that a plea not be accepted unless the judge
finds that there is "reasonable cause" to believe the defendant did do the
crime 34 1 is not adhered to and neither is the National Advisory
Commission's position that a plea of guilty not be accepted when the
"admissible evidence is insufficient to support a guilty verdict on the
offense" for which the plea is being offered.34 2 The requirement that the
finding be based on "admissible" evidence would prohibit the court's
reliance on hearsay or illegally obtained evidence.
A study of the National Institute of Justice 343 found that the factual
basis most commonly utilized by courts is "simply to ask the defendant
if he committed the offense" to which he's pleading. 344 By the time of
the plea allocution it is clear that the defendant has decided to take the
plea bargain and knows or has been instructed by counsel to tell the
court that he did indeed do the crime.345 Predictably, the National
Institute of Justice survey found that judges rejected guilty pleas in only
two percent of cases.346 Since efficiency and speed is the name of the
game, it is not unexpected that meaningful questioning of the defendant
does not occur and it is not surprising that the Institute concluded that
the plea34allocution
procedure is "close to being a new kind of 'pious
7
fraud."'
An excellent example of the meaninglessness of the plea allocution,
as well as the fraudulent nature of the process, is the following example

339.

See Beaman v. State, 221 N.W.2d 698, 700 (Minn. 1974) (per curiam) (recognizing the

basis for the factual basis requirement is to ensure that the defendant is guilty of a crime that is at

least as serious as the offense to which he's pleading guilty).
340.

MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE, supra note 326.

341.

Id. at § 350.4(3).

342.

NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS & GOALS, supra note 14,

at 3.7(8).
343.

WILLIAM F. MCDONALD, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PLEA BARGAINING: CRITICAL ISSUES

AND COMMON PRACTICES (1985).
344. Id. at 135.
345. See id at 133-34. Fifty-two percent of the defendants interviewed reported that their
counsel had advised them how to answer the judge's questions. See id
346. See id. at 135.
347. Id. at 134.
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of a question the court in Ohio v. Higgs348 asked the defendant, the
answer to which must be "Yes" for the plea to be accepted:
"[THE COURT]: Do you know you have the right to have a jury of
twelve people sitting over there hear this case and in order for you to
be convicted they would have to find as to the principal offense and as
to the specification that you did in attempting or committing a theft
offense or in fleeing immediately after that attempt or offense use or
threaten the immediate use of force against another in this county and
that in the commission of Robbery you
349 did have a firearm on or about
your person; do you understand that?
Defendants are often confused and bewildered in the courtroom setting
to start with, having to listen and attempt to comprehend a question such
as this hardly helps.
The plea allocution-the colloquy between the court and the
defendant-must also include the defendant's clear statement that he is
choosing to enter the plea voluntarily. 350 This concept of voluntariness
is, however, ambiguous and has been the subject of quite varying
interpretations. A plea will be found, by some courts, to be "voluntary"
if the defendant is acting "knowingly," i.e., if he is aware of what rights
he is relinquishing by not going to trial. By this understanding, there is
no significant process in which the court must engage to substantiate that
the plea was in fact "voluntarily" entered.351
It is more common, however, for courts to view the voluntariness
requirement of a constitutional guilty plea as meaning that the defendant
was not threatened, pressured, or coerced to enter the guilty plea. The
Supreme Court firmly stated in Machibrodav. United States352 that "[a]
guilty plea, if induced by promises or threats which deprive it of the
character of a voluntary act, is void., 353 The Supreme Court held in
Boykin v. Alabama354 that a plea, which was not "voluntary and

348. 704 N.E.2d 308 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997).
349. Id. at 310. In this instance, the defendant did in fact tell the judge that he did not
understand, and the judge simplified his explanation. See id.
at 310-11.
350. See, e.g., OHIO R. CRiM. P. 1l(c)(2)(a) (Anderson 2003).
351. See, e.g., id.at 1I(c)(2)(a) (instructing courts to determine whether a defendant who
pleads guilty "understand[s] ...the nature of the charges and of the maximum penalty involved,
and, if applicable, that the defendant is not eligible for probation").
352. 368 U.S. 487 (1962).
353. Id. at 493.
354. 395 U.S. 238 (1969) superseded by FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c) (West 1986 & Supp. 2004)
(codifying the plea bargain admonishments stated in Boykin).
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knowing," violates due process and is void.355 The Court also
determined that the record of the trial court proceeding must
affirmatively reflect that the defendant voluntarily entered the guilty
plea. 356 It is therefore required by the Pleas of Guilty Standards 357 that
the judge personally address the defendant to determine if the plea was,
in fact, voluntarily entered,358 i.e., whether the defendant had been, "in
359
any way, threatened, coerced, or pressured into pleading guilty.

The problem, then, is in one respect clear. Since in a great
percentage of pleas the defendant has been told by the judge, or the
prosecutor, or his counsel, or knows on his own that he'll serve more jail
time if he gets convicted after trial than if he were to plead guilty, how is
that not "pressure"? And when the judge is involved, then there so often
is a threat and coercion-whereas a prosecutor is not in a position to
actually determine the sentence after trial, the judge is. When the judge
informs the defendant that if he were to go to trial he would be sentenced
to the maximum possible incarceration if convicted, the judge is fully
able to carry out that threat. It is perhaps for that reason that the court in
State v. Cross36 ° stated categorically: "A plea induced by the
influence
3 61
of the judge cannot be said to have been voluntarily entered.
When the plea bargain has been initiated by the judge, there is an
additional and serious concern. It is the judge's responsibility before
finally accepting any guilty plea to determine the voluntariness of the
plea. How can the judge be the objective and impartial arbiter that is
required when assessing whether he had improperly pressured,
threatened, or coerced the defendant to enter the plea? Yet this is exactly
what occurs. Is one to expect that the judge, in making the required
determination of whether the plea was voluntary, would rule that he
355. Id. at 243 n.5 (emphasis added) (quoting McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466
(1969), superseded by FED. R. CRIM. P. 1 l(c) (West. 1986 & Supp. 2004)). Here, it would seem that

the court clearly does differentiate between voluntary and knowing, yet the decision continues to
explain that a plea "'cannot be truly voluntary unless the defendant possesses an understanding of
the law in relation to the facts,"' i.e., knowingly pleads guilty. Id.; see also North Carolina v.
Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1969) (requiring that the guilty plea represent a "voluntary and intelligent
choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant").
356.
357.

See Boykin, 395 U.S. at 244 & n.6.
See supra note 7.

358. See id.at Standard 14-1.5.
359. Id. at Standard 14-1.5 cmt.
360. 240 S.E.2d 514 (S.C. 1977) (per curiam).
361. Id. at 516; see also Commonwealth v. Evans, 252 A.2d 689 (Penn. 1969) (stating that a
plea cannot be considered voluntary if the judge has participated in the sentencing agreed to as part
of the plea bargain); State v. Wolfe, 175 N.W.2d 216, 221 (Wis. 1970) (asserting that "[t]he vice of
judicial participation in the plea bargaining is that it destroys the voluntariness of the plea").
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improperly threatened the defendant? The judge must be the neutral,
impartial, and objective adjudicator of the voluntariness of the plea, and
his involvement in the plea
deal prohibits him from appropriately
3 62
fulfilling that judicial duty.
The system's response, however, to the clear need to prohibit
judicial involvement in the very process which the judge must review, is
that if the plea allocution reveals that the defendant's decision to plead
was voluntary, then there is no cause for concern. However, any
participant in the criminal justice system knows that the colloquy
between the judge and the defendant is scripted, ritualistic, perfunctory,
pro forma, and quite meaningless. The mere fact that the defendant's
answer to the judge's question, "Did anyone threaten or pressure you to
get you to plead guilty?" is "No," is not necessarily an accurate
reflection of what has occurred.363 The transcript of the colloquy
discussed previously between Judge Rothwax and the defendant, where
the judge told the defendant, "[today,] 2 to 4... [and] after, that it's
4 to 8 ,364 would reveal the very simple response of "No" to the judge's
question as to whether there had been threats or pressure that caused the
defendant to plead guilty. And since the defendant in a post-conviction
challenge to the voluntariness of the plea bears the burden of persuading
the court that the plea in fact was not a voluntary one, 365 it is likely that
that very limited exchange of question and answer between the judge
and the defendant during the allocution will control and the defendant
will not be able to meet his burden.
When a defendant is told by a judge that if he doesn't admit his
guilt he will receive many more years in prison if convicted after trial,
even the innocent defendant36 6 may well be influenced.3 67 Especially

362. Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 724 (1948) (describing the judge's obligation when
assessing the propriety of an offered plea of guilty, where there was a waiver of counsel, as one
requiring a "penetrating and comprehensive examination of all the circumstances under which such
plea is tendered"). Certainly, there is a need to be just as thorough and careful in assessing the
voluntariness of the entry of a guilty plea.
363. See Galbraith v. United States, No. 01-cv-4012, 2001 U.S. Dist. Lexis 24939, at *9 (S.D.
Ill. Nov. 14, 2001) (recognizing that, even though the plea hearing may reveal the facial validity of
the plea, the plea still may have not been voluntary due to factors not revealed during the allocution
or the hearing).
364. Roberts, supra note 87 and text accompanying notes 87-93.
365. See Galbraith,2001 U.S. Dist. Lexis at *8.
366. It is necessary here to distinguish between "factual innocence" (for example, where the
defendant is simply the wrong person) and "legal innocence" (where the defendant did commit the
act in question, but the state is unable to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt, or where there is
a valid defense, such as self-defense, to explain and justify the defendant's actions).
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when it is clear that that person in the robes who is convinced the
defendant is guilty will be the trial judge.368 Especially when the
accused's counsel is not only unprepared for trial but is also doing his
utmost to persuade the defendant to plead guilty. 369 The threat of a huge

sentence awaiting the individual who opts for trial can be all-controlling,
even to the innocent. The power of the judge to persuade anyone to do as
the judge says is far greater, and far more problematic, than when the
prosecutor is conducting the plea negotiations. When a judge believes, as
did the judge in United States v. Hutchings,370 that a trial would be a
"'total waste of public funds and resources,' 37 1 the defendant who
chooses to go to trial will pay.
It would be naive to believe that a judge who has reacted with such
displeasure at the defendant who has not taken his advice and pled guilty
will be the fair and impartial arbiter that is required.372 Certainly in the
defendant's eyes, that judge who was perceived to be an adversary
pressing a guilty plea is hardly then to be expected to be the guarantor of
a fair trial and of a fair, non-punitive sentence. And it is this perception
that well might lead the innocent defendant to feel coerced to enter a
guilty plea and avoid the risk of trial.
367. The Restatement of Contracts realizes the power of the threat to overcome one's free will.
A threat may well "arouse such fear as precludes a party from exercising free will and judgment"
and may lead a party to agree to what is being demanded. Commentary to Section 175 of the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, quoted in United States v. Speed Joyeros, 204 F. Supp. 2d 412,
425 (2002).
368. See McMahon v. Hodges, 225 F. Supp. 2d 357, 374 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (providing an
example where the "trial judge ... leveraged [defendant's] fear that [the judge] had prejudged [the
case and was biased against the defendant] to induce [the defendant] to waive his right to a jury
[trial]").
369. See LEFSTEIN, supra note 264, at app. at F-1. The lack of vigorous advocacy seems to be
the case for those representing juveniles being prosecuted for criminal offenses. For example, an
ABA analysis of juvenile courts in Ohio in 2003 found that only fifty-seven percent of individuals
with court-appointed counsel viewed their lawyer to be actually "on their side." ABA JUVENILE
JUSTICE CENTER ET AL., JUSTICE CUT SHORT: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND
QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS IN OHIO 56 (Kim Brooks & Darlene

Karmine eds., 2003). This is in contrast to eighty-one percent of those with privately retained
counsel who believed that their counsel was working for them. See id.
370. 757 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1985).
371. Id. at 13 (quoting Judge Robert L. Carter).
372. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 1, Canon 3(E)(1) (mandating
disqualification when "the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned"). The Supreme
Court "repeatedly has recognized [that] due process demands impartiality on the part of those who
function in judicial or quasi-judicial capacities." Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 195 (1982),
supersededby 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(b) (2003); see also Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 668 (1987)
(plurality opinion) (recognizing that "[t]he right to an impartial adjudicator, be it judge or jury,
is... a right" "so basic to a fair trial that [its] infraction can never be treated as harmless error").
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To some extent, the judge whose plea offer was not accepted has an
interest in the outcome of the trial that is totally divergent from that of
the defendant; if there's an acquittal the judge will be shown to be wrong
and the defendant right in refusing to plead guilty.373
There are many ways that a judge can affect the likelihood of the
jury returning a guilty verdict. The judge's charge to the jury, not only in
content but in manner of delivery,374 can be of great import. Judges have
discretion in their evidentiary rulings as they have in marshaling the
evidence and charging the jury. They also typically have at least some
discretion in determining to grant or deny, for example, discovery
motions. It is hardly conceivable that a judge who had been promoting a
pre-trial plea will seriously consider a defendant's motion for a judgment
of acquittal during the trial, regardless of its merits. The same would
hold true regarding a post-trial motion for the judge to overturn a guilty
verdict.
The judge's attitude towards and lack of respect for the defendant's
case can be easily discerned by a jury based on the judge's treatment of
defense witnesses, or defense counsel or, if the defendant testifies, of the
defendant himself. It is not only through verbal behavior such as friendly
(or hostile) questioning of certain witnesses, but via non-verbal facial
gestures or expressions as well that a judge can influence jurors. Such
prejudicial judicial misconduct is unreviewable by appellate courts,
unless defense counsel attempts to place it on the record as was done in
375
People v. Stiglin:
"I want to state for the record that I wish your Honor would cease
making these remarks, that he would cease smiling and frowning and
doing things which might lead the jury to believe he has an opinion as
to the facts in this case, and I ask the Court to please instruct the jury to
disregard any such
smiles or frowns or what-not as the jury may see
376
the Court make."

373. See State v. Falcon, 793 A.2d 274, 277 (Conn. 2002) (stating that a trial judge is expected
to be unaware of the details of unsuccessful plea negotiations and holding that a trial judge's
participation in the plea negotiations is plain error for which actual prejudice need not be shown).
374. For example, while the judge is required to inform the jurors that in order to convict the
prosecution must prove its case "beyond a reasonable doubt," the judge either swallows those
words, reads them as though they are just a part of the required littany and without real meaning, or
emphasizes, highlights, and directs attention to the phrase.
375. 264 N.Y.S. 832 (App. Div. 1933).
376. Id.at 847.
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Even if the judge is determined to be fair and impartial during the
trial, in the defendant's eyes the judge who has attempted to get the
defendant to plead guilty has determined that the defendant is indeed
guilty and will be "an advocate for the resolution he has suggested to the
defendant., 377 Don't we all resent, somewhat at least, an individual who
refuses to take our advice? In the defendant's view, the judge will not be
commencing the trial with the "presumption of innocence" that the judge
must, ironically, instruct the jurors is required. In some cases, the judge
who has promoted a plea has assumed guilt from the start, but other
times, as part of the negotiations, the defendant will have made
incriminating statements which might well impact the judge as he
conducts the trial.
It would certainly be of some help if there were a policy that any
judge who participated in plea negotiations with the defendant would not
then proceed to be the trial judge as well.378 However, it appears that the
trend is, if anything, in the opposite direction as court administrators are
increasingly assigning one judge to follow a case from beginning to end.
For example, a Minnesota court system adopted a "one judge-one case"
calendar specifically to get early resolution of criminal cases. 379 The plan
was initiated on July 1, 2002 and within six months it was deemed to be
successful: whereas in the last quarter of 2001, 162 cases had been set
for jury trial, there were only twenty-seven cases in the comparable
period for 2002.380 This eighty-three percent reduction was considered to
be the standard for success-more pleas, fewer trials had occurred when
the defendant understood that the judge who would know of his refusal
to accept the plea deal would stay on as the trial judge.

377. United States v. Werker, 535 F.2d 198, 203 (2d Cir. 1976).
378. See, e.g., Revelo, 775 A.2d 260, 268 n.25 (Conn. 2001) (stating that Connecticut has a
clear practice of transferring a case to a second judge for trial if plea negotiations were
unsuccessful). This commentator is certainly aware that this is an imperfect solution at best. The
trial judge would surely become aware of the pre-trial history of the case. In this commentator's
experience as a defense attorney in the Manhattan courts for ten years, a judge who has been
pressuring the defendant for a plea will make it clear to the defendant that in case he were not to be
the trial judge, he will indicate the defendant's rejection of the plea offer on the court papers that go
to the trial judge. In some cases, the pre-trial judge will add that if the defendant is convicted at trial,
he should be sentenced to the maximum sentence authorized.
379. Press Release, Sherburne County Courts, Sherburne Court Initiatives Improve Access to
Justice (Feb. 12, 2003), at http://www.courts.state.mn.us/cio/Story/SCIIA.htm (last visited June 30,
2004).
380. See id.
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It is clearly unconstitutional for a judge to explicitly punish a
defendant for choosing 381
to go to trial. As the Supreme Court stated in

Bordenkircherv. Hayes:

To punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows
him to do is a due process violation of the most basic sort, and for an
agent of the State to pursue a course of action whose objective is to
penalize a person's
reliance on his legal rights is "patently
382
unconstitutional."

Even before the Supreme Court was so forceful, the Circuit Courts
of Appeal had been equally explicit. The Eighth Circuit, stated in Hess v.
United States, 383 that it was joining a "host of other courts" ' 3 84 in ruling
that "whether a defendant exercises his constitutional right to trial by
jury to determine his
guilt or innocence must have no bearing on the
385
sentence imposed.,
The Supreme Court's decisions regarding permitted disparities in
sentence between pre-trial offer and post-conviction sentences have
certainly created a conundrum leading, this commentator would suggest,
trial courts to be somewhat disingenuous about their imposition of posttrial sentences. The Court has deemed it constitutionally acceptable in
Corbitt v. New Jersey3 86 for courts to extend leniency in exchange for a
guilty plea and not to extend leniency on those who insist on trial.387
Somehow, this ruling is not to conflict with Supreme Court rulings
prohibiting trial courts from imposing a harsher sentence on a defendant
381. 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
382. Id. at 363 (citations omitted) (quoting, ultimately, United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570,
581 (1968)).
383. 496 F.2d 936 (8th Cir. 1974).
384. Id. at 938.
385. Id. (emphasis added); see also Baker v. United States, 412 F.2d 1069, 1073 (5th Cir.
1969) (stating that "[a]n accused cannot be punished by a more severe sentence because he
unsuccessfully exercised his constitutional right to stand trial rather than plead guilty"); United
States v. Araujo, 539 F.2d 287, 291-92 (2d Cir. 1976); People v. Accolla, 508 N.Y.S.2d 43, 45
(App. Div. 1986); People v. Patterson, 483 N.Y.S.2d 55, 57 (App. Div. 1984) (imposing a higher
sentence simply because the defendant chose to go to trial rather to plead guilty is impermissible);
State v. Cannon, 387 S.E.2d 450, 451 (N.C. 1990) (finding the sentence of trial court improper
because it was based in part on defendant's refusal to plea bargain and insistence on a jury trial).
386. 439 U.S. 212 (1978).
387. Id. at 226; see also People v. Latto, 710 N.E. 2d 72, 82 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (concluding
that it is proper to grant concessions to the defendant pleading guilty, but a defendant should not be
penalized for asserting his right to trial). But see People v. Superior Court (Felmann), 130 Cal. Rptr.
548, 552 (Ct. App. 1976) (recognizing that "a court may not offer any inducement in return for a
plea of guilty or nolo contendere. It may not treat a defendant more leniently because he foregoes
his right to trial or more harshly because he exercises that right.")

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2004

57

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 4 [2004], Art. 14

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:1349

because he has exercised his constitutional right to trial.388 The apparent
inconsistency is explained in that the defendant who exercised his right
to trial is NOT being sentenced more harshly because he chose trial, he is
just not being provided the leniency that he would have received had he
pled guilty. 389 The untenability of this explanation, especially perhaps to
a convicted defendant,
is illustrated by the comment of the trial judge in
390
In re Lewallen:
I think I want to emphasize there's no reason in having the District
Attorney attempt to negotiate matters if after the defendant refuses a
negotiation he gets the same sentence as if he had accepted the
negotiation. It is just a waste of everybody's time, and what's he got to
lose. And as far as I'm concerned, if a defendant wants a jury trial and
he's convicted, he's not going to be penalized with that, but on the
other hand he's not39going
to have the consideration he would have had
1
if there was a plea.
And punish defendants, courts do. Sometimes it is very explicit as
in State v. Scalf.392 The trial judge told the defendant after the jury came
back with their guilty verdict: "We had the police and the prosecutor
sitting down here for three days to convict you and impanel this jury and
try it, and for that you're going to be punished.,393 Suppose the trial
lasted five days, or ten days, would the punishment increase for each day
that the trial lasted? The punishment in this case for the three days of
trial time was eighteen months in prison. 394 As the judge explained to the
jurors: "[L]adies and gentlemen, I want you to know, had he been
willing to enter a plea on this case, he would have been afforded
probation. He wouldn't have gone to the institution. But now you're
going to the institution., 395 The defendant was to be jailed for not doing
what the man on high had told him he should have done-pled guilty
pre-trial.

388. See, e.g., Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 801 (1989).
389. Cf Lowe, supra note 59 (reporting that Judge Ruskin stated that the higher fine was not
because the defendant wore jeans to court, but because he could not be afforded the same leniency
had he not worn jeans that day).
390. 590 P.2d 383 (Cal. 1979).
391. Id. at 385, 388 (internal quotation marks omitted) (vacating the sentence, remanding for
resentencing, and holding that the trial judge based his sentence on the defendant's decision to plead
not guilty).
392. 710 N.E.2d 1206 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998).
393. Id. at 1212 (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).
394. See id. at 1208-09.
395. Id. at 1212 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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It is more typical for judges at sentencing merely to impose a harsh
sentence without stating clearly that the sentence constitutes punishment
for the defendant exercising his constitutional right to trial.396
Additionally, appellate courts have commonly upheld such sentences
and rejected defendant's claim that the sentence constituted punishment
as long as the court does not explicitly state that the harsh sentence was
motivated by the defendant's choice to go to trial. Therefore, one finds
such unsupportable reasoning as was adopted by the court in People v.
Ralon:397 "It is true that a sentencing judge commits reversible error by
punishing a defendant for exercising his right to trial by jury. By
contrast, where the sentencing court denies imposing sentence as
punishmentfor exercising the right to trial, there is no error.-398 Denial
that the higher sentence was for demanding a jury trial is apparently all
that is required for the violation of the defendant's rights to be
constitutional.399 In fact, even if there was no express denial, as long as
there was no affirmative statement that the post-trial sentence was
designed to punish the defendant for not taking the plea offer, courts
may find the sentence appropriate and not punitive.40 0
The Supreme Court in Alabama v. Smith40 1 set out the difficult path
for the defendant. The Court held not only that there is no presumption
that the sentencing judge acted vindictively simply because the
396. See generally, e.g., In re Cox, 680 N.E.2d 528, 530 (Ind. 1997) (per curiam) (suspending
Judge Cox for his policy of sentencing defendants to lengthier sentences simply because they
demanded time-consuming jury trials rather than just pleading guilty). For some judges it is
absolutely not necessary to state in every case that the post-conviction sentence was influenced by
the defendant's refusal to plead guilty; it's a given. For example, one trial judge in Indiana had a
policy for ten years of giving convicted defendants lengthier sentences because those defendants
had demanded time-consuming jury trials instead of bench trials or entering guilty pleas. Id.
397. 570 N.E.2d 742 (Il. App. Ct. 1991). The co-defendant had pled guilty and waived his
right to a trial in exchange for a sentence of seven years, the twelve year sentence Ralon received
after trial was upheld by the Appellate Court of Illinois. See id.
398. Id.at 765 (emphasis added). The co-defendant had pled guilty and waived his right to a
trial in exchange for a sentence of seven years; the twelve year sentence Ralon received after trial
was upheld by the Appellate Court of Illinois. See id.
399. But see Fraley v. State, 426 So. 2d 983, 984-86 (Fla. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that the
twenty-five year sentence imposed after trial was presumptively unlawful because the record
revealed that the judge had full knowledge of the evidence and defendant's criminal record when
the judge repeatedly promised a term of six years to the defendant were he to have entered a guilty
plea pre-trial).
400. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Hawkins v. Haws, No. 98 C 1103, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
9985, at *52 (N.D. Ill.
June 24, 1999) (mem.) (finding that the sentence was proper where the
petitioner could offer no proof, other than the disparity between the pre-trial and post-trial
conviction sentences, that the higher sentence was a penalty for not pleading guilty).
401. 490 U.S. 794 (1989).
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defendant received a harsher sentence after trial 40 2 but that the defendant
had the clear burden to prove vindictiveness.4 °3 The Court offered little
illumination on how exactly the defendant could prove the motivation of
the sentencing judge.
Courts have, knowing that they can't explicitly "punish" the
defendant for having chosen to go to trial, developed varying
justifications for sentencing the defendant after trial more harshly than
the sentence that was offered if the defendant would have pled guilty.
First and foremost is the claim that the defendant who shows remorse,
and accepts responsibility for what he has done, is on his way toward
rehabilitation. 40 4 The Court in Hooten v. State40 5 expressed the comment
found in many court decisions: "[G]uilty pleas are recognized as a
significant step toward rehabilitation., 40 6 The defendant who pleads
guilty, therefore, is not, according to the Ninth Circuit in ' United
States v.
40 8
Stockwell40 7 "an intransigent and unrepentant malefactor.
Any seasoned court watcher knows, however, that the guilty plea
by a defendant is generally given because the defendant has engaged in a
cost-benefit analysis and decided not to risk going to trial. The defendant
pleads guilty to reduce his punishment; it's a matter of expediency.
Remorse has very little to do with it, and judges, who, if anything, are
more cynical then the rest of us, are fully aware of that.
Consider the case of United States v. Wiley.409 Wiley was charged,
along with four others, with possession of stolen goods, and the evidence
showed that Wiley, in all likelihood, was the least guilty of the three.4
The other defendants accepted the judge's plea bargain offer but Wiley
did not. Of Wiley's co-defendants, three received sentences of one year

402. See id. at 801-02.
403. See id. at 799. When the transcript "is devoid of any indication that the court punished
defendant for exercising his right to trial, defendant's sentence must be affirmed." People v. Latto,
710 N.E.2d 72, 83 (I11.App. Ct. 1999).
404. See Vincent & Pron, supra note 23 (indicating that Canadian criminal courts also equate
pleading guilty with contrition). The equating of "pleading guilty" with "contrition" seems to exist
in Canadian jurisprudence as well. For example, the policy manual for the crown attorneys, who are
the prosecutors in the Toronto criminal courts, instructs that "'[a]n early guilty plea generally
signals remorse."' Id.
405. 442 S.E.2d 836 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994).
406. Id.at 840.
407. 472 F.2d 1186 (9th Cir. 1973).
408. Id. at 1187.
409. 184 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. ill. 1960).
410. See id. at 680, 687. The judge himself characterized Wiley as only a "minor participant"
in the crime. Id. at 687.
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and a day, and one was sentenced to a term of two years.4 11 The judge, in
justifying the sentence of three years for Wiley, wrote that Wiley's
choice to go to trial indicated that he was not "actually repentant'412and
not "seriously concerned with rehabilitation which is generally true
when a defendant pleads guilty. ' 4 13 The four defendants who pled guilty,
on the other hand, "did stand conscience-stricken in repentance before
the court," as revealed merely by the plea.4 14 Yet the judge admitted that
the real reason for sentencing the least guilty to the longest term was that
he believed that if an individual chooses to go to trial, the court should
not be lenient upon sentence. 4 5 The judge explained that the Assistant
United States Attorney, as did several investigators, spent three days
preparing for the trial and one day on trial.416 The judge's denial of
Wiley's application for probation may have had, in reality, nothing to do
with Wiley's greater need for rehabilitation but rather the decision
according to the judge, was "rightfully motivated in part by the fact that
he stood trial."4 17 After all, the judge commented, "I myself spent one
half day in preparation for trial and then one day on trial and accordingly
the Court was totally occupied for a day and a half."41 8 Perhaps that's the
real reason why the judge had a "'standing policy' not to consider
probation where a defendant has exercised his constitutional right to
trial.

'419

411. Seeid. at680-81.
412. Id.at 685. The judge added that "there was no remorse in this man" Id.at 687.
413. Id.at685.
414. Id. at 687; see also, e.g., United States v. Mazzaferro, 865 F.2d 450 (1st Cir. 1989)
(providing another example of a large disparity between a co-defendant's guilty plea, which resulted
in a shorter sentence, and Mazzaferro's sentence, which followed a post-trial conviction).
Mazzaferro's co-defendant, who accepted the plea bargain, received a sentence of ten years,
whereas Mazzaferro, who had gone to trial, received a twenty year sentence, even though his
involvement in the drug operation was less than his co-defendant's, and Mazzafero had only a
minimal criminal record. See id.at 452-53; see also Vickers v. State, 17 S.W.3d 632, 636 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2000) (stating that defendant's twenty year sentence was much greater than his co-defendant's
and it was clear that the sentence was motivated by the defendant's rejection of the plea offer and
choice to go to trial).
415. Wiley, 184 F. Supp. at 685.
416. See id. at 685.
417. Id. at686.
418. Id. at685.
419. Id. at 684. The New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct has commented on
judge's setting policies affecting sentencing: "Judicial discretion, which is at the heart of a judge's
powers, is nullified when a judge imposes a 'policy' that will dictate sentences in future cases."
Tracy, (N.Y. State Comn'n on Judicial Conduct, Nov.
19, 2001), available at
http://www.scjc.state.ny.us/Determinations/TF/tracy,_edward.htm.
Judge Tracy's policy was to
impose strict sentences on all defendants in certain drunk driving cases. See id.
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There has been no empirical research that this commentator is
aware of that demonstrates that the "contrite" defendants who have
"taken responsibility for their crimes" and entered into a plea bargain
have a lower rate of recidivism than do those defendants sentenced after
conviction at trial. A court's conclusion that the guilty plea shows
"repentance" by the defendant is not supportable by any research which
shows that such an individual will "transgress no more." Yet even the
United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual has provided a benefit for
an individual who has shown remorse because it "clearly demonstrates
acceptance of responsibility for his offense. 42 ° Can a court really
conclude that the defendant who took two-to-four today because next
time the offer would be three-to-six shows that this individual is well on
his way towards being rehabilitated?
What might very well be the case is that the system which allows
judicially-coerced plea bargaining creates a disrespect for the criminal
justice system and its laws that hardens and embitters both the defendant
who finally took the plea deal because of judicial threats, as well as the
defendant who is sentenced to a greater period of incarceration because
he chose to go to trial. To talk of reformation or rehabilitation in such a
context might well be foolhardy. Furthermore, it is no longer widely
believed that rehabilitation is a goal of our prisons; the focus today of
imprisonment is incapacitation (keeping the individual off the streets),
retribution (the criminal should be punished because of the harm he has
inflicted), or deterrence (citizens must know that if they commit a crime,

420. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3El.l(a) (2003). The Sentencing Commission
had initially considered a proposal to reward defendants who pled guilty with a reduction of 1015% in the sentences they'd receive. See William W. Wilkins, Jr., Plea Negotiations, Acceptance of
Responsibility, Role of the Offender, and Departures: Policy Decisions in the Promulgation of
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 23 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 181, 190 n.61 (1988). The data utilized
by the Commission showed that defendants who had pled guilty typically received a 30-40%
reduction in the time they would have gotten had they gone to trial. See id. at 190. The automatic
sentencing reduction was rejected in favor of giving a benefit to any defendant who showed
remorse. See id. The 1987 Commentary to the Guideline on acceptance of responsibility stated that
a "'defendant may manifest sincere contrition and take steps toward reparation and rehabilitation
even if he exercises his constitutional right to trial."' GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING'S
TRIUMPH 228 (2003) (emphasis added) (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1
cmt. (1987)). The Commission's commentary was amended and switched gears and informed that
the downward adjustment of sentence "is not intended to apply to a defendant who puts the
government to its burden of proof at trial by denying the essential factual elements of guilt, is
convicted, and only then admits guilt and expresses remorse." U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 3El.1 cmt. n.2 (2003) (emphasis added). It would be the rare case, according to the
commentary, where the defendant "clearly demonstrate[s] an acceptance of responsibility for his
criminal conduct even though he exercises his constitutional right to a trial." Id.
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they will be punished). The fundamental reason for the decline of the
"rehabilitative ideal" has been that there's a growing acceptance of the
belief that rehabilitative attempts simply are not effective. Attempts to
develop scientific evidence that rehabilitative programs reduce
recidivism have not proven successful. 42'
But even if there were to be a return to the rehabilitative model, and
there is some evidence that this is occurring,.422 how can a judge read a
defendant's mind and assume that the defendant who chose a jury trial,
clearly needs more years of incarceration in order to become
rehabilitated than the defendant who pled guilty? One answer to that
question that some courts have provided is that when a defendant who
chose to testify at trial gets convicted, it is clear that the defendant lied
and therefore is not ready to assume responsibility for having committed
the crime. The Supreme Court in United States v. Grayson423 expressed
the view that a "defendant's truthfulness or mendacity while testifying
on his own behalf, almost without exception, has been deemed probative
of his attitudes toward society and prospects for rehabilitation and hence
relevant to sentencing. 42 4
A court's decision to punish a defendant not only because he opted
for trial but also because he compounded the error of his ways by
testifying at the trial is bound to have a doubly chilling effect on the
exercise of one's constitutional rights. 25 A defendant, who wants to go
to trial, but is fearful of a greater sentence, may simply engage in a
cost/benefit analysis and be persuaded not to testify.426 As we have seen
421. See People v. Adams, 425 N.W.2d 437, 450 n.6 (Mich. 1988) (Levin, J., dissenting)
(quoting Francis A. Allen, Central Problems of American CriminalJustice, 75 MICH. L. REv. 813,
321 (1977) (footnotes omitted)).
422. For examples of the programs experimenting with alternatives to incarceration, see Drake
Bennett & Robert Kuttner, Crime and Redemption; States are Using Fiscal Scarcity to Find More
Creative Approaches to Reducing Crime, THE AM. PROSPECT, Dec. 2003, at 36 (reporting on
programs that focus, especially on those charged with possession of small amounts of drugs, on
rehabilitative programs designed to deal with the addictive, psychological, and educational concerns
and needs of the particular individual).
423. 438 U.S. 41 (1978).
424. See id.at 50.
425. Under our Constitution, the defendant has the right to testify as well as to remain silent.
See U.S. CONST. amend. V; Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 612 (1972) (recognizing a
defendant's right to testify). But see State v. Pereira, 805 A.2d 787, 811 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002).
(rejecting the idea that any "chilling effect" on the right to testify overrides the need to consider all
evidence relevant to the issue of rehabilitation).
426. See People v. Moriarty, 185 N.E.2d 688, 689 (Ill. 1962); see also People v. Young, 314
N.E. 2d 280, 281 (Il1.App. Ct. 1974) (resentencing the defendant because the trial judge tacked on
extra year to the sentence as punishment for the defendant's choice to go to trial); see, e.g., State v.
Thornton, No. E2001-0249, 2002 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 818, at *22 (Sept. 30, 2002) (stating that
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in a different context 427 threats by the court don't have to be expressly
stated in each instance to be of great influence. A lawyer's warning to
his client to the effect that "this judge adds time to your sentence if you
testify" will do the trick.428 It is required that judges be clear that the
sentence is not "punishment" for the crime of perjury,429 which would
require the prosecution formally charging an individual with perjury,
presenting the case to a grand jury, and offering the defendant the right
to a trial before a jury of one's peers on the perjury charge, 430 but rather
that the lying is reflective of the defendant's prospects for
rehabilitation. 431 As the court in People v. Adams 432 explained, the false

testimony "circumstantially indicates the absence of a character trait for
being law-abiding that bears on the appropriate sentence. 433
But where should the line be drawn? Should the judge expressly
consider as an indication of poor character the fact that the defendant
permitted his lawyer to conduct a cross-examination of a witness that the
jury, as shown by their verdict, found to be credible? And what exactly
does it indicate about the defendant's readiness for rehabilitation that

the trial court concluded that because the defendant testified on his own behalf but was found guilty,
he had lied under oath and the sentence imposed would reflect defendant's lack of candor). The
sentencing judge, if he so chooses, can punish every defendant who testified at trial and now stands
before him to be sentenced, since the defendant's testimony in support of his innocence was
obviously not accepted by the jury as truthful. See id.
427. See Moriarty, 185 N.E.2d at 689; Young, 314 N.E. 2d at 281; supra note 34 and
accompanying text.
428. Cf Grayson,438 U.S. at 54 (concluding that "[a]ssuming, arguendo" that there might be a
chilling effect in permitting a judge on sentencing to consider the defendant's untruthful testimony,
"that effect is entirely permissible"). Years later, the Court unanimously reaffirmed that there was
no right for any individual to give false testimony. See Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 173 (1986).
429. Perjury statutes do apply to defendants who testify on their own behalf. See Nix, 475 U.S.
at 173; Grayson, 438 U.S. at 54. .
430. These safeguards are vital components and protections afforded by our Constitution and
criminal justice system. The United States Sentencing Guidelines authorize an enhancement in the
defendant's sentence for willful obstruction of justice which includes committing perjury at trial.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3C 1.1cmt. n.4(b) (2003). Although there is some dispute
amongst the federal courts as to the proper evidentiary standard for the courts to use in making
factual determinations that the defendant lied under oath, it appears that the preponderance of the
evidence standard is most commonly utilized. See, e.g., United States v. Jasper, 291 F. Supp. 2d
248, 259-60 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (adopting the preponderance of the evidence standard while noting
that other courts in the Second Circuit are using the clear and convincing standard).
431. See State v. Huey, 505 A.2d 1242, 1247 (Conn. 1986); Banks v. United States, 516 A.2d
524, 530 (D.C. 1986); State v. Degen, 396 N.W.2d 759, 760 (S.D. 1986) (allowing consideration of
the defendant's false testimony when the judge is determining sentence).
432. 425 N.W.2d 437 (Mich. 1988).
433. Id.at 444. The Supreme Court of Michigan added that "character is always at issue." id.
at 448.
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witnesses testified on his behalf who the judge did not believe were
telling the truth? The more of a case the defendant puts forward, and
perhaps the greater the number of days that the defense "uses up" both in
direct and cross-examination of witnesses, the less cooperative and the
less receptive to rehabilitation he may be thought to be-and therefore,
the need for greater punishment. It is not just the choice to go to trial that
is endangered, it is the exercise of the very mechanisms of the trial
process itself that may be at risk.434
Some appellate courts in approving the plea bargaining policies
engaged in by the trial courts have been quite frank in justifying their
perspective. The court in People v. Selikoff, for instance, stated that trial
court's policy aimed at obtaining guilty pleas was "acutely essential to
relieve court calendar congestion .... In budget-starved urban criminal
courts, the negotiated plea literally staves off collapse of the law
enforcement system. 4 35 The Preliminary Draft of the Sentencing
Guidelines 436 for federal courts stated as its first purpose for rewarding
guilty pleas: "to conserve the resources of the criminal justice
system. ' ,437 Additionally, the Supreme Court, in Santobello v. New
York,438 one of its first decisions approving of plea bargaining, stated
that "[i]f every criminal charge were subjected to a full-scale trial, the
States and the Federal Government would need to multiply by many
times the number of judges and court facilities. '' 39
One problem with focusing on the positive attributes of plea
bargaining is that the trial-level judges get the clear message that those
in charge want the pleas and rapid disposal of cases. And that is all too
often the case. The most valued judge is the one who can clear the
calendar the quickest, process the greatest number of cases, get the most
pleas. A study by the Association of the Bar of the City of New York 440
concluded that "judicial performance is measured by the ability to move
cases" and that "intense pressure on judges to keep pace with volume

434. See id. at 452 (Levin, J., dissenting).
435. People v. Selikoff, 318 N.E.2d 784, 788 (N.Y. 1974) (citation omitted).
436. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES (Preliminary Draft 1986).
437. Id. at § B322 cmt. Whatever happened to the idea that "[a]n affluent society ought not be
miserly in support of justice, for economy is not an objective of the system?" Mayer v. City of
Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 201 (1971) (Burger, C.J., concurring); see also Warren E. Burger, No Man
Is an Island, 56 A.B.A. J. 325, 325 (1970) (arguing that defendants must be provided with full due
process and "full measure of days in court" regardless of expense).
438. 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
439. Id. at 260.
440. REPORT ON THE CASELOAD CRISIS, supranote 128.
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leads sometimes to injustice." 44 1 The situation in Chicago has been
described in a like manner; the judges there were so concerned about
how their rate of dispositions compared to that of their colleagues that
they would greet each other with the inquiry, "How are your dispositions
this month? 4 4 2 An examination of the California criminal courts
revealed that the administrative judge would reprimand any criminal
court judge who was not processing his calendar rapidly enough." 3
One problem that has occurred as a result of both administrative
pressure and pressure by colleagues to rapidly dispose of cases is the
creation of a culture that defines "effectiveness" by one criterion onlyand it would not be a measurement of the level of persistence in
preserving the rights of defendants.444 In fact, one system for the
administrative evaluation of criminal court judges was developed to
"measure judicial productivity more effectively" 445 and defined (or
redefined) "quality ' 4 6 as follows: there were to be "three appropriate
objective measures of quality .

. .

. [and they] are reasonably prompt

average disposition times, limited numbers of court appearances and
manageable calendar sizes. '"447 This method of evaluating judges means
441. Id. at 17.
442. Albert W. Alschuler, The Trial Judge's Role in Plea Bargaining,Part 1, COLUM. L. REV.
1059, 1100 (1976) (internal quotation marks omitted).
443. See Jerome H. Skolnick, Social Control in the Adversary System, 11 J. CONFLICT
RESOLUTION 52,55 (1967).

444. The pressures and problems of the courts that prosecute juveniles for criminal offenses are
very similar those existing in the criminal courts. The culture of the juvenile courts has been
described as one which is "driven by case-processing statistics" where the "refusal to acknowledge
the importance of adhering to due process and the role of defense counsel results in a culture that
relegates defense counsel to little more than a decorative ornament in a process that often results in
unfair outcomes." MARYLAND: AN ASSESSMENT, supra note 263, at 4.
445. Sam Roberts, State to Adopt One-Case, One-Judge System, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1985, at
1.
446. Merriam-Webster's Online Dictionary defines "quality" as "degree of excellence" or
"superiority in kind." See http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary.
447. Id. (quoting statements issued by the supervising panel, lead by Judge Robert J. Sise)
(internal quotation marks omitted). What is so shocking about this list of three indications of quality
is that they all require the "quality" judge to spend as little time as possible on each case. Several
states, however, are engaged in judicial evaluation schemes which differ radically from this New
York approach. For a discussion of the various states' judicial evaluation programs, see generally
Seth Anderson, National Summit on Improving Judicial Selection: Judicial Retention Evaluation
Programs, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1375 (2001). New Mexico's Statewide Judicial Performance
Evaluation Program, for example, sends questionnaires to litigants, witnesses, jurors, and attorneys
who have had contact with a particular judge who is being evaluated. The questions asked will deal
with fairness, knowledge of the law, preparation and attentiveness, temperament, and administrative
skills. See id. at 1383. Attorneys will be asked a greater number of questions that relate to the legal
ability of the judge. See id. at 1383-84.
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that the judge who does move his calendar by threatening to impose the
maximum sentence unless the defendant pleads guilty, is evaluated
positively. The defense counsel, defendant, court observers, and quite
possibly even the prosecutor might regard this judge quite poorly, but
the court administrators know only that the judge is rapidly disposing of
his cases. The Chief Judge of the felony trial courts in Detroit has been
explicit about his appreciation of the judges who are most able to get
pleas and expedite the processing of cases. Those judges are referred to
as "executive floor judges" and are so assigned because, as the Chief
Judge stated: "We want the threat [of drawing a stiff sentence] to stay
here."" 8
This culture of the criminal courts, which values rapid processing
of cases above all else, can even lead to situations such as that of In re
Sardino.449 Judge Sardino, who was found to have routinely denied
defendants their rights, attempted to present to the State Commission on
Judicial Conduct 450 that was considering possible discipline of the judge,
with the general
evidence to show that his practices were "consistent
45t
system.
court
his
of
judges
other
of
practice"
One other factor appears at times as a justification for why a
defendant who insists on trial should be sentenced more severely than
the defendant who pleads guilty pre-trial. The trial judge in State v.
Sandefer452 made the case for the sentence he imposed post-conviction:
I know that defendants who do enter pleas of guilty, in cases of this
nature, it saves the parent and the child a lot of grief, in that they don't
have to go through this experience, this heart rendering experience in
the courtroom in having a poor little girl testify in front of a whole
bunch of strangers about what happened to her.

448. Court, supranote 2, at 56 (quoting Dalton Roberson, Chief Judge of the Recorder Court).
449. 448 N.E.2d 83 (N.Y. 1983).
450. The New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct was created in 1974 when the
Legislature created a temporary commission to investigate and prosecute cases of judicial
misconduct. See http://www.scjc.state.ny.us. The Commission is authorized to initiate its own
complaints, conduct investigations and formal hearings, and subpoena witnesses and documents.
See N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 22(a) (2001). If the Commission determines that disciplinary action is
appropriate it can impose one of the following sanctions: admonition, censure, removal, or retire a
judge for disability. See id.The disciplined judge can request review by the Court of Appeals. See
All fifty states have created commissions to insure compliance with the established ethical and
id.
professional standards for judicial behavior. See http://www.scjc.state.ny.us.
451. In re Sardino, 448 N.E.2d at 85. The Court of Appeals accepted the determined sanction
of the Commission and ordered the judge removed from office. See id.
452. 900 P.2d 1132 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995).
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Mr. Sandefer, if you entered a plea of guilty, I very possibly would
have given you a more lenient sentence towards the lower end of the
range, because of saving the victim being victimized by going through
this court process. You didn't, and I'm not going to give you that
break.453
Punishing the defendant for making the state prove its case (which of
course entails calling the alleged victim as a witness) is a clear
punishment for the defendant's exercising his constitutional right to trial.
In order for judges to properly comply with the responsibilities and
obligations of their office, they must be free from the influence not only
of politicians, but from their supervisors who are demanding the rapid
processing of cases. Judicial independence means independence from
the pressure of those who have power over them.454 As an 1872 Supreme

Court decision stated: It is of the "highest importance... that a judicial
officer.., shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without
apprehension of personal consequences to himself., 455 It is appropriate
that judges act in accordance with the state and United States
constitutions that they've taken an oath to uphold,456 that they follow
judicial precedent, adhere to the state and federal laws, and comply with
their ethical responsibilities. 457 The very first Canon of the Model Code
of Judicial Conduct informs that "[a]n independent and honorable
judiciary is indispensable to justice in our society. ' 45" And a 2003
amendment to the Commentary for that Canon states: "An independent
judiciary is one free of inappropriate outside influences.'459
453. Id.at 1133 (quoting the transcript of the lower court). The Court of Appeals of
Washington upheld the sentence. Id.at 1135; see also SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 436, at
§ B322 cmt. (1986) (providing leniency for pleading guilty is warranted in part because "witnesses
(particularly victims) are spared the stress of trial").
454. See Alfred P. Carlton, Jr., PreservingJudicialIndependence-An Exegesis, 29 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 835, 839 (2002); see also ABA, AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY: REPORT OF THE ABA
COMMISSION ON SEPARATION OF POWERS AND JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE (1997) (finding certain

problems exist in federal courts, but that the most serious threats to the independence of the
judiciary existed at the state court level), available at http://www.abanet.org/govaffairs/
judiciary/execprob.html.
455. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 347 (1872).

456. See supra notes 252-56 and accompanying text.
457. See Penny J. White, Special Series: Judicial Independence: Judging Judges: Securing
Judicial Independence by Use of JudicialPerformance Evaluations, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1053,
1061-62 (2002).
458. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 1, at Canon 1(A) (emphasis added).
459. Id. at Canon 1(a) cmt. Alfred Carlton, Jr., the ABA's President in 2003, had "made

judicial independence a primary focus of his presidency." See Robert A. Stein, Standing Up for
Judges, 89 A.B.A. J. 67 (July 2003).
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This commentator suggests that the pressures on the judge to clear
his calendar, and the rewards to the judges that do, most certainly are

"inappropriate" influences on a judge. Career-based self-interest may
often lead to policies and decisions that will not conform to the ethical
and constitutional requirements of office that should be paramount. The
path to advancement is to impress those in control of the judge's future
path-court administrators or county executives-and a judge
accomplishes that by efficiently and cost-effectively processing the
caseload. 460 Judges are all-too-much like the rest of us, they respond to
incentives, 46 and incentives can include promotion, preferred

assignments within the court structure, re-nomination, or just the respect
of one's peers.46 2

Judicial independence demands that a judge follow the rule of
law-including ensuring the due process rights of the defendant-when
making any decision, especially one that relates to the liberty of an
individual who is prosecuted in his courts. Pressure on the judge to do
otherwise comes not only from senior court officials or governmental
offices concerned with limiting expenditures which too often is
translated into restricting trials, the media can exert influence as well.
This is not the appropriate forum to discuss the pressures that may
generally exist from the media to be "tough on crime, ' ,463 but rather to

highlight the media's emphasis at times on the desirability of the courts'
budgets being as low as possible to save money. So, for example, the
Dallas Morning News in endorsing a candidate for reelection to the
criminal court emphasized that the judge had "reduced the court backlog
significantly and saved taxpayers money," 464 i.e., pressed for guilty pleas
and avoided trials. It is certainly rare to see a judge championed in the
460. See BUTCHER & MOORE, supra note 259, at 20 (indicating that in some places in the
country, judges feel great pressure from county commissioners to control expenses in their criminal
courts, which, of course, means to obtain pleas instead of conducting costly trials).
461. See Neil S. Siegel, Sen and the Heart of Jurisprudence: A Critique of the Economic
Analysis of Judicial Behavior, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1581, 1583 (1999) (reasoning that standard
economic theory would expect that judges would act rationally, that is, engage in behavior to
maximize their self interest).
462. See Roundtable Discussion, Is There a Threat to Judicial Independence in the United
States Today?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 7, 26 (1998) (Second Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Guido
Calabresi commented regarding federal judges: "If I were to identify the single greatest threat to
judicial independence today, it would be the fact that judges want to move up.").
463. Nor is this the appropriate time to examine how the Feeney Amendment, which Congress
passed in the Fall of 2003, and which reduces the discretion of federal judges in sentencing
defendants, impacts upon the independence of the judiciary.
464. Editorials: JudicialElections; Ballot Strongfor Dallas County Voters, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Feb. 27, 1998, at 34A.
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press for his focus on the due process rights of those charged with crime.
But a judge's sworn obligations cannot take second place to the desire to
please the media, even if a potential endorsement for re-election is at
stake.
The only instance where this commentator concludes it is
appropriate to impose a greater sentence post-trial than that which was
offered to the defendant were he to have pled guilty pre-trial is if the
judge did indeed learn of some aggravating factors during the course of
the trial that he had not known of during plea negotiations. It is certainly
true at times that upon hearing the testimony of witnesses, especially the
victim of the crime, the actions of the defendant will appear to be more
heinous than originally thought. However, it may often be the case that
the prosecutor had overcharged the defendant or exaggerated the gravity
of the defendant's conduct to strengthen the prosecutor's hands during
plea negotiations and the trial testimony does not fully support the
charge or the prosecutor's claims. If such be the case, the sentence ought
be less than was suggested pre-trial. A judge who wishes to sentence the
defendant more harshly after trial ought to be required to justify on the
record what it was that the judge had now become aware of that was
unknown pre-trial that would warrant the harsher sentence.
CONCLUSION

A poor, uneducated defendant is brought from the cell he has been
in since his arrest to the court for arraignment. He meets his counsel for
the first time; the lawyer has just received information concerning the
charges against the defendant. The counsel relates to the defendant the
offer of the prosecutor; the defendant maintains his innocence and he
does not want to plead guilty. The judge becomes aware that the case is
not "going to go away" unless he intervenes. The judge calls defense
counsel and prosecutor to the bench for an off-the-record discussion
after which counsel goes back to his client and tells him that there's a
one-time-offer on the table; if he doesn't take it, the offer at the next
court appearance will entail twice as much incarceration. The lawyer,
overloaded with an unmanageable caseload, tells the defendant he
should take the plea. The defendant continues to insist he's innocent and
the judge then tells defense counsel that that judge will be staying with
the case for its duration and if the defendant does choose to go to trial,
the judge will sentence him to the maximum incarceration possible. No
one has asked the defendant to provide his account of the criminal
charges against him; everyone assumes his guilt. The prosecutor, of
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course. The defense counsel is no advocate; the judge is no impartial
arbiter. It is a given that bail would be set at an amount the defendant
could not possibly meet.465
This is an inherently coercive atmosphere; one which could well
cause even an innocent individual to realize that his most sensible
option, indeed perhaps his only option, is to take the plea deal that will
never be offered again. The setting and the pressures are strikingly
similar to those the Supreme Court found to be intolerable in Miranda v.
Arizona, where the entire thrust of the suspect's interrogation "was to
put the defendant in such an emotional state as to impair his capacity for
rational judgment.... [T]he compelling atmosphere of the in-custody

interrogation, and not
an independent decision on his part, caused the
' 4 66
defendant to speak.

The pressure and intervention of the judge is, this commentator
suggests, the tipping point. If the defendant could at least hope for a fair
trial before an impartial judge, and if the defendant could at least expect
a judge who would guarantee his right to effective assistance with a
lawyer who prepared his defense and conducted the requisite
investigation, 467 then perhaps the defendant's "will to resist ' ' 4 6 8 would
not have been overpowered. The Supreme Court's remedy to the
coercive atmosphere of in-custody police interrogation was to require
the Miranda-warnings be given and to establish the right of an individual
to have counsel present. 469 The remedy for the courtroom coercive
atmosphere should be to prohibit the judge's involvement in trying to
persuade the defendant to plead guilty. As the court stated in Euziere v.
United States, "[A] plea of guilty interposed as the result of coercion is
,,470
not consistent with due process ....
It is qualitatively different when it is the judge, and not the
prosecutor, who engaged in plea negotiations with the defendant. Our
adversarial system of justice assumes that the judge is a neutral,
detached, impartial arbiter and not a partner with the state's
465. On the walls of the U.S. Department of Justice is an inscription: "The U.S. wins its point
whenever justice is done its citizens in the courts." Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). We
all lose when injustice such as the scenario described is allowed to occur. As the Supreme Court
stated, "our system of the administration of justice suffers when an accused is treated unfairly." Id.
466. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 465 (1966), superseded by 18 U.S.C.A. § 3501(b)
(West 2000) (codifying Mirandarights).
467.
468.

See PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION, supra note 25, at Standard 4-4.1.
Miranda,384 U.S. at 467.

469. See id. at 473.
470.

Euziere v. United States, 249 F.2d 293, 295 (10th Cir. 1957).
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prosecutorial arm seeking to have the defendant adjudicated guilty. The
Separation of Powers doctrine deems the prosecutor to be part of the
executive branch, and the judicial branch is not to usurp the powers of
the executive. As the court stated in Francolino v. Kuhlman, "the mere
appearance of partiality, even if unfounded,, greatly undermines the
credibility of the criminal justice system."4 71 Certainly the judge who
clearly lets the defendant know that he will pay a price in terms of a
harsher sentence for failing to heed the judge's advice to plead guilty,
will not appear to be the impartial guarantor of the fair trial as required
by the Constitution.4 72
There is, of course, some degree of inducement when the
prosecutor is the party who is negotiating a possible plea agreement with
the defendant. It is a given that the district attorney is the defendant's
adversary, and it is "accepted as constitutionally legitimate the simple
reality that the prosecutor'sinterest at the bargaining table is to persuade
the defendant to forego his right to plead not guilty. ' ,473 But whereas the
prosecution and the defense "arguably possess relatively equal
bargaining power,, 474 such is certainly not the case for "His Honor"
(who holds the power ultimately to determine to a very significant
degree one's liberty) and the defendant. When it is the prosecutor who is
doing the negotiating, there is, theoretically, a crucial check on whether
there was coercion which led to the plea: the judge must determine the
voluntariness of the plea.475 When the judge, however, is the active
solicitor, there is no independent source, no third party to assess whether
471. See Francolino v. Kuhlman, 224 F. Supp. 2d 615, 630 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). Although the
right to be tried before an impartial judge is not specifically stated in the Constitution, the Supreme
Court acknowledged the vital nature ofthis right. See Tumey v,Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927); see
also Hawkins v. Le Fevre, 758 F.2d 866, 875 (2d Cir. 1985) (referring to the trial judge as "the
system's bastion of neutrality"); Gayle v. Le Fevre, 613 F.2d 21, 24 (2d Cir. 1980) (Oakes, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that "[b]ias or partiality of the judge goes right to the core of due process");
People v. De Jesus, 369 N.E.2d 752, 755 (N.Y. 1977) (instructing that "the Bench must be
scrupulously free from and above even the appearance or taint of partiality"); Frischling v. Schrank,
260 N.Y.S.2d 537, 538 (App. Div. 1965) (recognizing that "[t]he right to be tried by a Judge who is
reasonably free from bias is a part of the fundamental right to a fair trial").
472. See J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 161 n.3 (1994) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (explaining
that "[w]ise observers have long understood that the appearance of justice is as important as its
reality").
473. Bordenkircherv. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) (emphasis added).
474. Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 799 (1970) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
475. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 n.5 (1969), superseded by FED. R. CRIM. P.
I I(c) (West 1986 & Supp. 2004) (codifying the plea bargain admonishments stated in Boykin);
McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969), superseded by FED. R. CRIM. P. 1l(c) (West
1986 & Supp. 2004); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487 (1962); see also supra notes 35256 and accompanying text.
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the plea was freely and voluntarily given; the same judge, whose
involvement led to the plea, is the one who determines the propriety of
those very tactics. 476
Judicial involvement in plea negotiations can violate the due
process rights of defendants in a number of very significant ways. The
judge who threatens to and does enhance the defendant's sentence
because he chose to exercise his constitutional right to trial is punishing
the defendant not only for the exercise of that right,477 but also because
he claimed his Fifth Amendment privilege to remain silent, not to
incriminate himself, to plead not guilty. 478 The defendant's Fourth
Amendment rights may well be violated because the judge often is
insisting on an immediate plea and the defendant is unable to have a
hearing to determine if the evidence against the defendant was illegally
obtained. 479 The same applies to the defendant's challenge to the
prosecutor's claim that the defendant "confessed"-there is no
opportunity for the defendant to show that he was never informed of his
Miranda rights. 480 Perhaps most significantly, the Sixth Amendment
right to effective assistance of counsel is often denied. The judge does
not afford counsel the opportunity to provide "counsel" as required
under the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution, the ABA Model Code

476. See Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 724 (1948) (describing the judge's obligation
when assessing the propriety of an offered plea of guilty, where there was a waiver of counsel, as
one requiring a "penetrating and comprehensive examination of all the circumstances under which
such plea is tendered").
477. See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978); Hess v. United States, 496
F.2d 936, 938 (8th Cir. 1974). Our criminal justice system has historically placed great import on
the right to a jury trial. THE FEDERALIST No. 83 (Alexander Hamilton) (noting that "[t]he friends
and adversaries of the [Constitutional Convention], if they agree in nothing else, concur at least in
the value they set upon the trial by jury"), available at http://www.law.emory.edu/FEDERAU
federalist/feder83.html (last visited July 26, 2004). The Supreme Court stated that "the right of an
accused to a trial by a constitutional jury [must] be jealously preserved." Patton v. United States,
281 U.S. 276, 312 (1930); see also Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 35 (1965) (quoting Patton,
281 U.S. at 312, when it described jury trials as the "normal and ... preferable mode" of resolving
criminal cases). Our increasing emphasis on obtaining guilty pleas has diminished instead of
preserved the right of a jury trial.
478. See United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581-82 (1968); State v. Boone, 239 S.E. 2d
459,465 (N.C. 1977).
479. See, e.g., Goss v. State, 730 So. 2d 568, 570-71 (Miss. 1998); SELLING JUSTICE SHORT,
supra note 264, at 16. The judge may even penalize the defendant as to the plea which is to be
offered if the defendant pursues motions. See supranotes 303-09 and accompanying text.
480. 384 U.S. 436, 467-68, 473 (1966), superseded by 18 U.S.C.A. § 3501(b) (West 2000)
(codifying Miranda rights).
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482
of Professional Responsibility 48 I and Rules of Professional Conduct,
or the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice.483
The adversarial process suffers when the judge departs from his
neutral role in that the lawyer is not able to provide effective
representation for his client because counsel has typically not had time
to develop any familiarity with the case. The judge relies on the ofteninaccurate and incomplete police report and the prosecutor's claims to
form the basis for the court's assumption of guilt and there is no work on
behalf of the defense to counter this. There is no adversarial testing of or
challenge to the accusations; the lawyer has been reduced to the role of
conveyor of the judge's offer and, possibly, the judge's threats. The
result is what the Supreme Court warned against in United States v.
Cronic:4 84 "[I]f the process loses its character as a confrontation between
adversaries, the constitutional guarantee [to effective assistance of
counsel] is violated., 485 The judge does not permit counsel to engage in
the adversarial testing which our system requires, and in which our
citizens put their faith.486 The result of such a proceeding is simply
"unreliable because of a breakdown in the adversarial process that our
48 7
system counts on to produce just results.,
The fact that these rights are being denied in the name of the
efficiency and economy which are "needed" in order to enable the courts
to deal with their overload of cases 488 does not make the violation of
these basic due process rights "just a little bit unconstitutional." As the
Supreme Court stated years ago, "the Constitution recognizes higher
values than speed and efficiency.'' 89 And when the violator is not just

481.
482.
483.

See PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 163.
See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, supranote 163.
See PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION, supra note 25, at Standard 3-

3.11 (a).
484. 466 U.S. 648 (1984).
485. Id at 656-57; see also Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 204 (1979) (explaining that it is
counsel's responsibility to oppose the government in adversary litigation).
486. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318-19 (1981); Anders v. California, 386 U.S.
738, 743 (1967) (Our adversarial system requires that the accused has "counsel acting in the role of
an advocate.").
487. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 696 (1984).
488. See Jerome H. Skolnick, Social Control in the Adversary System, 11 J. CONFLICT
RESOLUTION 52, 55 (1967); Roberts, supra note 445.
489. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S 645, 656 (1972). The Court continued: "Indeed, one might
fairly say of the Bill of Rights in general, and the Due Process Clause in particular, that they were
designed to protect the fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing concern for
efficiency and efficacy ....Id.
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the state, but the judge who is required under our Constitution 490 and the
Model Code of Judicial Conduct4 91 to be the very individual who must
safeguard and protect these rights, the situation is intolerable. The rule of
law that too often is followed by the judge is his own: "In my court, if
you don't take the plea I have offered you, I will sentence you much
more harshly upon conviction after trial. ' ' 92 The judge's rule of law, in
many instances, need not be repeated in every case to every defendant;
the rules followed in that court become well known to all.
The Supreme Court, when it held that plea bargaining between a
prosecutor and defense counsel did not violate the defendant's
constitutional rights, offered a caveat: "Of course, the agents of the State
may not produce a plea by actual or threatened physical harm or by
mental coercion overbearing the will of the defendant. ' 493 The Court
must realize what is patently clear: in at least some situations, judicial
involvement in plea negotiations can constitute mental coercion. The
most appropriate way of dealing with that possibility is to adopt a
prophylactic rule, a "bright-line" prohibition. Such a ban on the judge
negotiating a plea with the defendant exists in the federal courtS, 494 the
time is long overdue for it to apply to the state courts as well.

490.
491.

See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 71 (1942).
See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supranote 1.

492. See, e.g., Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 226 (1978).
493. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 750 (1970) (emphasis added).
494. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 1l(c)(1) (West 1986 & Supp. 2004).
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